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WHAT STANDARD OF CARE SHOULD GOVERN THE
WORLD'S SHORTEST EDITORIALS?: AN ANALYSIS
OF BOND RATING AGENCY LIABILITYt
"[Standard & Poor's] does not encourage companies to man-
age themselves with an eye toward a specific rating. The more
appropriate approach is to operate for the good of the business as
management sees it, and to let the rating follow."'
On January 19, 1990, Moody's Investor's Services, Inc., one of
the nation's largest bond rating agencies, lowered its rating on RJR-
Nabisco's existing debt, citing worries as to whether the company's
cash flow was sufficient to allow it to meet upcoming interest pay-
ments on its convertible debentures. 2 Even though Standard &
Poor's Corp., Moody's major rival, reaffirmed its own higher rating,
RJR-Nabisco's bonds still lost twenty percent of their value within
the next two days-a cumulative fall of several hundred million
dollars.3
t I thankJoanne W. Rose, Vice President & Counsel for Standard & Poor's Debt
Rating Services Group, for her helpful comments throughout the drafting of this Note.
In addition, I thank Professors George Hay, Jonathan Macey, and Dale Oesterle, and
Managerial Economics Ph.D. candidate Dan Lovallo, for their advice and comments.
Finally, I am especially thankful for the assistance of Lori Bostrom, Chris Considine,
Susan Green, and Anne Marie Hill during the editing and production of this piece. I
add the obligatory disclaimer, of course, which is that all errors are solely mine.
1 STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, DEBT RATINGS CRrrIERIA 4 (Roy Weinberger
ed. 1986) [hereinafter S & P DEBT RATINGS CRrrERIA]; see MOODY'S INVESTOR'S SERVICE,
INC., MOODY'S ON MUNICIPALS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISSUING DEBT 49 (Fred S. Acker-
man ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOODY'S ON MUNICIPALS].
Commentators disagree as to whether bond rating agencies affect the cost of the
capital, or merely reveal the underlying risk. Compare DAVID F. HAWKINS, BARBARA A.
BROWN & WALTERJ. CAMPBELL, RATING INDUSTRIAL BONDS 11, 15 (1983); James S. Ang
& Kiritkumar A. Patel, Bond Rating Methods: Comparison and Validation, 30J. FIN. 631, 631
(1975); Thomas M. Tole & Sammy D. McCord, A Bond Rating Agency's Influence on Utilities'
Cost of Capital, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 20, 1986, at 34 with George W. Hettenhouse &
William L. Sartoris, An Analysis of the Informational Value of Bond-Rating Changes, 16 Q. REv.
ECON. & Bus. 65, 76 (1976); George E. Pinches & J. Clay Singleton, The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to Bond Rating Changes, 33 J. FIN. 29, 42 (1978); Douglas Randall, A Bond
Rating Agency's Lack of Influence on Utilities' Cost of Capital, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 20, 1986,
at 52; Mark I. Weinstein, The Effect of a Rating Change Announcement on Bond Price, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 329, 331 (1977).
Whether the rating communicates new information to the market or only reveals
existing information in a more efficient fashion, the rating does influence the cost of a
security's issue, its marketability, the status of a company's existing securities, the com-
pany's overall credit rating, the maturity date of the issue, and the company's equity. D.
HAWKINS, B. BROWN & W. CAMPBELL, supra, at 15.
2 Judith H. Dobrzynski, David Zigas & Walecia Konrad, Moody's May Have Lowered
the Boom Too Fast, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 63.
3 Id
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Some analysts declared that Moody's had "goofed," and that
the "bomb" that Moody's had dropped on the investment markets
was simply "overreaction. ' 4 Although it is still unclear whether
Moody's simply made a mistake, one thing is certain: even if
Moody's was clearly negligent in assigning its rating, neither the em-
battled RJR-Nabisco nor its disgruntled bondholders are likely to
recover any of their losses from Moody's in court. Given tort law's
emphasis on compensating harmed parties, how is it possible for
one private, largely unregulated entity to exercise such discretion
without having to compensate relying parties?
Bond rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's5 and
Moody's, 6 specialize in gathering and analyzing public and private
information 7 about debentures. 8 The results are reported in a letter
4 Id; see David Zigas, Why the Rating Agencies Get Low Marks on the Street, Bus. WEEK,
Mar. 12, 1990, at 106, 108 ("Many professionals in the market view the ratings of the
three agencies as 'rear view mirror' analyses. 'They are lagging indicators of credit qual-
ity,' says Bruce N. Lehmann, an associate professor of law at Columbia University Busi-
ness School.").
5 Standard & Poor's Corporation was formed by the 1941 merger of Poor's, an
agency that began rating securities in 1922, and Standard Statistics, which began rating
securities in 1923. Louis H. Ederington & Jesse B. Yawitz, The Bond Rating Process, in
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONs (Edward I. Altman 6th ed. 1988).
In 1966, McGraw-Hill, Inc., a major publisher of numerous financial books and
magazines, including the popular magazine Business Week, acquired Standard's Poor's,
Inc. Today, Standard & Poor's has ratings outstanding on issues of over 1700 corpora-
tions and 7000 municipalities and states, and commercial paper ratings on over 600
corporations. D. HAWKINS, B. BROWN, & W. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 18. In ratings
matters, Standard & Poor's operates independently of McGraw-Hill. S & P DEBT RAT-
INGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 5.
6 Moody's Investor's Service, Inc. began rating railroad bonds in 1909, and indus-
trial bonds in 1914. Since 1940, it has been a registered investment adviser under sec-
tion 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, ch. 686, § 203, 54
Stat. 847, 850-52 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1987)). Dun & Bradstreet, a
firm involved in nearly all aspects of the financial markets, owns Moody's. D. HAWKINS,
B. BROWN & W. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 17; Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23,
at 23.
7 Public information is data that is available to the public, such as annual reports
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Private information is data inter-
nal to the issuing corporation. The public information required usually includes a regis-
tration statement, a prospectus, the most recent annual or quarterly report, annual
reports of the past five years, and subsequent quarterly financial statements. HUGH G.
SHERWOOD, How CORPORATE AND MUNICIPAL DEBT IS RATED: AN INSIDE LOOK AT STAN-
DARD & POOR'S RATING SYSTEM 22, 27 (1976).
Both Standard & Poor's and Moody's ask the issuer to provide financial statements
dating back five years and forecasts of key elements of future earnings. Both agencies
request the firm's capital spending plans and plans for future financing. Standard &
Poor's also asks for comparisons with competitors. In addition, the issuing company
often provides more information to bolster its chance for a better rating. See S & P DEBT
RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 13; Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 24.
Moody's reports that the issuing firm's chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and
treasurer usually attend rating meetings-"an indication of the importance attached to
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grade, "primarily measur[ing] the likelihood of default."9 The
agencies compile these grades and send them to investors who sub-
scribe to the service.'
0
The bond rating services are popular with investors because
they can rate securities' riskiness far less expensively than can an
individual investor." The information the services provide im-
proves the market's efficiency by equalizing prices at the margin so
that the securities more accurately reflect the market's collective
preference for risk.12
Bond rating agencies operate with surprisingly little govern-
ment regulation.' 3 The tort system and the market serve as the only
checks on bond rating agencies. 14 Additionally, instead of being
held to a negligence standard, as is the norm in other areas of the
law,' 5 bond rating agencies receive full first amendment protection
the rating." Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 24. The same is true at Stan-
dard & Poor's. See H. SHERWOOD, supra, at 22.
8 A debenture is "a certificate or bond acknowledging a debt on which fixed inter-
est is being paid." OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 218 (paperback ed. 1980).
9 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 40. Moody's agrees, noting that
the fundamental goal of credit analysis is "evaluating the borrower's ability and willing-
ness to pay." MOODY'S ON MUNICIPALS, supra note 1, at preface.
10 The subscription price for Standard & Poor's flagship publication, CreditWeek,
was $1,450 per year at the beginning of 1989. STANDARD & POOR'S, INC., CREDrrWEEK,
Jan. 2, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter S & P CREDrrWEEK]. The subscription price for Moody's
Bond Record (published monthly) was $160 per year. MOODY'S INVESTOR'S SERVICE, INC.,
MOODY'S BOND RECORD, Oct. 10, 1988, foreward [hereinafter MOODY'S BOND RECORD].
S1I See infra notes 24-29, 41-42 and accompanying text. At the same time, the rated
firm is willing to spend money to secure the benefits of a rating because the cost of a
rating is less than the decrease in the cost of capital that the rating gives it. See infra note
86.
12 See Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 18. Bond rating agencies do this
by reducing information acquisition costs (the costs of initially producing information),
information processing costs, and information verification costs (the costs of finding out
if the information is accurate). Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 594-95 (1984). In addition, bond rating agencies
cut the cost of inter-industry risk comparison by providing the investor with a common
yardstick to measure risk. Cf Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Accounting: Some Eco-
nomic Issues, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1987).
13 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 3; see McGRAw-HILL, INC., STAN-
DARD & POOR'S RATINGS GUIDE 4 (Kiril Sokoloff&Joan Matthews eds. 1979) [hereinafter
S & P RATINGS GUIDE]; MOODY'S ON MUNICIPALS, supra note 1, at 2.
14 H. SHERWOOD, supra note 7, at 137.
15 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (reprinted infra note 69); see also
infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text for reasons why society imposes a negligence
standard on suppliers of products.
Split ratings, in which the two major rating agencies give different ratings to the
same issue, are potential evidence of mistaken ratings. For example, when International
Paper issued $150 million in sinking-fund debentures, Moody's upgraded the company
from A to Aa, while Standard & Poor's downgraded it from AA to AA-. AHMED
BELKAOUI, INDUSTRIAL BONDS AND THE RATING PROCESS 22 (1983). Split ratings affect
approximately 13% of new industrial bonds. Studies show that the differences are prob-
ably mostly due to random factors and the complexity of bond rating. The differences
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as a member of the media, 16 and are not held liable unless found to
be reckless.
17
In recent years, the accounting profession has experienced a
rapid expansion in its potential liability to relying parties.' 8 The ra-
tionales for much of this expanded liability are economic in nature.
Many courts believe that accountants are best able to avoid mistakes
at the least cost, better able to spread the risk of mistakes, and better
able to insure against negligent missteps.' 9 Thus, both the standard
of care imposed on accountants, as well as the number of relying
parties who are able to recover, are increasing dramatically. This
revolution in accountant liability even has begun to affect other pro-
fessionals, such as lawyers.
20
Because many similarities exist between the advice of an ac-
countant and the credit analyst at Standard & Poor's, some enter-
prising court may make what seems a logical step and attempt to
import this expanded accountant liability to the ratings arena. Such
an expansion would in turn rest largely on the same economic foun-
dations which underlie the newly expanded accountant liability.
The question remains, however, whether this expanded liability
makes sense.
This Note attempts to determine the proper standard of care
for bond rating agencies by employing both an economic and first
are evenly distributed, with Moody's rating being higher approximately half the time,
and Standard & Poor's the other half. Louis H. Ederington, Why Split Ratings Occur, 15
FIN. MGm-r. 37, 46 (1986); Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 49-50; see
Pinches & Singleton, supra note 1, at 42 n.15.
16 See, e.g., First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175 (2d
Cir. 1989) [hereinafter First Equity III]; First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's
Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aft'd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
First Equity II]; First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter First Equity I]; Pittman v.
DowJones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987), aft'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987);
Gale v. Value Line, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1986); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R.,
51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443
F.2d 1301 (1971);Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921),
aff'dmem., 202 A.D. 805, 194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div. 1922), aff'd mem., 235 N.Y. 511, 139
N.E. 714 (1923); Daniel v. DowJones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1987);
Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986).
17 For a sampling of traditional media cases, see, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For an article arguing that traditional negligence
principles should apply to media defendants, see Gerald R. Smith, Media Liability for
Physical Injury Resulting from the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193 (1988).
18 For a sampling of these cases, see infra note 72. For a good summary of this
trend, see John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform,
86 MicH. L. REV. 1929 (1988). Comparisons and contrasts to this recent expansion of
accountant liability as they apply to the topic of this Note are scattered throughout the
text and footnotes. See, e.g., infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
19 See Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1959.
20 See infra note 71.
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amendment analysis. Part I briefly describes the function of bond
rating agencies and provides a brief discussion of how they operate.
Part II considers whether any form of regulation is needed, given
the strong economic incentives for non-negligent performance
which the market imposes on bond rating agencies, and develops
the economic arguments for and against retaining the recklessness
standard. Part III analyzes the effect of the first amendment on
bond rating agencies, and compares the result with the economic
arguments developed within Part II. This Note concludes that ex-
tending the logic of recent accountant liability cases to bond rating
agencies is troublesome from both an economic and a first amend-
ment perspective. 2'
I
THE VALUE OF BOND RATING AGENCIES IN A
WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY
"The paramount responsibility of [Standard & Poor's] debt
rating division is to provide an accurate appraisal of credit risk to
the investor-nothing more, and nothing less."
'22
Capital markets rely on accurate information to ensure that
money moves to those who can use it most effectively, and to ensure
that investors make optimal savings choices. 23 Securities research,
however, exhibits many characteristics of a public good, making it
unlikely that investors, if left to conduct securities research on their
own, would produce sufficient information. Investors often can
benefit from someone else's research without themselves contribut-
ing to its production.24 Because of this, investors will not conduct
21 This Note does not consider possible actions against a bond rating agency under
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), promulgated under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934. To win under Rule lOb-5, a purchaser must demonstrate
that the misstatement caused her to invest in the securities. Moreover, she must show
that the rating agency engaged in "knowing or intentional misconduct." Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). Because the continued existence of a rating
agency depends on its conveying accurate information, the likelihood that a rating
agency intentionally gave inaccurate information is very small. Thus, the plaintiff's
heavy burden of proof renders causes of action arising under Rule lOb-5 exceedingly
difficult to win. See generally Mark A. Helman, Rule lOb-5 Omissions Cases and the Investment
Decision, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1982) (background on Rule lOb-5 and investing);
Note, Fraud-on-the-Market Theory After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 964
(1989) (authored by Zachary Shulman).
22 Randall, supra note 1, at 52.
23 Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1984); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 747 (1984).
24 Coffee, supra note 23, at 722-33. This is true because securities information "sel-
dom can be confined to a single user because many people have a motive to leak it....
In fact, it is generally in the tippee's interest, once he has traded, to inform others to
415
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enough research on their own. 25
Rating agencies facilitate the flow of information by processing
public information and distilling it into a useful form at a far lower
cost than the individual investor would incur.26 Thus, investor deci-
sions are based on better information,27 which in turn helps the
market route capital to the best investments.28 To the extent that
create excitement and induce a market upswing." Id. at 725; see Saul Levmore, Efficient
Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REv. 645, 649 (1984). At the same time,
investors produce an excess of other types of information by duplicating each other's
research. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 734; infra notes 42, 198-201.
25 See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
26 Since efficiency in the capital market depends on the distribution of infor-
mation, it is ultimately a function of the cost of information to traders.
The lower the cost of particular information, the wider will be its distribu-
tion, the more effective will be the capital market mechanism operating to
reflect it in prices, and the more efficient will be the market with respect
to it.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 593; see also id. at 616. See infra notes 34-40 and
accompanying text for further discussion of how rating agencies help the markets work
efficiently.
27 The financial press also helps to reduce the costs of bringing information to the
market. Indeed, it is not at all rare to find bond ratings or even market analyses pub-
lished in various financial magazines. Although this at first seems paradoxical-giving
the product away for free-in fact it is quite logical. Supplying the market with informa-
tion helps ensure a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the paying customers have already used
the information in their investments, its subsequent release accrues to their benefit: the
trading activity of the nonpaying investors moves the price in favor of the original inves-
tors. Coffee, supra note 23, at 725-26;Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 801-02 (1985).
See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 600-03 (noting the role of the financial
press in reducing costs of information distribution, and discussing a variety of market
techniques which reduce information costs).
28 "An efficient market is often defined as one in which securities prices impact all
publicly available information instantaneously." Coffee, supra note 23, at 747; see ALAN
GARaT, HANDBOOK OF THE MONEY AND GAPrrAL MARKETS 2 (1988). However, commenta-
tors differ as to how much information is needed to make the markets function effi-
ciently. According to the efficient capital markets hypothesis, information need only be
available to a small group of traders. These traders, by their trading, transmit signals to
the market that a security is misvalued, so that the security's price then moves to the
proper level. Thus, "in a well-functioning market, the prices of... securities will reflect
predictions based on all relevant and available information." William F. Sharpe, Discus-
sion, 25 J. FIN. 418, 418 (1970); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW
415-19 (3d ed. 1986). If this is true, in the strong form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, "a blindfolded chimpanzee throwing darts at the stock pages of The Wall
Street Journal could.., select a portfolio that performs as well as one carefully chosen by
the experts." Burton J. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market Efficient?, 243 SCIENCE 1313, 1313
(1989). There are three forms of the theory, however, depending on whether the mar-
ket incorporates only historical information (weak form), historical plus all publicly
available information (semi-strong form), or all information known by any market par-
ticipant (including nonpublic information (strong form)). Id. Though the efficient capi-
tal markets hypothesis long has been a fixture in economics, some empirical researchers
have become "pessimistic about the chances of success for traditional models in which
all agents are assumed to be fully rational." Werner F. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, A
Mean-Reverting Walk Down Wall Street, 3J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 200 (1989). For example,
investors show a tendency to "overreact" to recent news. Because of this, stock market
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the interest rate accorded each issue better reflects the underlying
riskiness of the investment, potential issuers can better evaluate
whether the project has a positive present value, and hence is worth
supporting. 2
9
To appreciate the value of bond rating agencies, consider a sys-
tem in which bond rating agencies do not exist. Such a system's
capital markets would be plagued with high information costs.30 Of
all the factors that a potential bond investor must consider, the
probability that she will lose her investment is one of the most im-
portant. At the same time, the investor often wishes to increase her
potential yield by investing in higher yielding but riskier bonds if
she can do so with minimal extra risk.3 1 To find these profit oppor-
tunities, the investor must spend time and money evaluating the
riskiness and potential return of various investment opportunities.
32
The returns from investing in research, however, are likely to
"losers" which are trading at an abnormally low yield may produce supra-normal yields.
See Werner F. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and
Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557 (1987); see also DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT, HIGH
YIELD SECURITIES: AMERICA'S WORKING CAPITAL 14 (Joseph C. Bencivenga & David M.
Millison eds. 1988) (noting similar overreaction in the bond markets).
Even proponents of the efficient capital markets hypothesis disagree as to the mech-
anism's reaction time. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 567-69. If the market reacts
slowly, then searching out undervalued securities is a rational strategy. Id. One thing is
certain, however: "[v]irtually all sophisticated commentators agree that no money man-
ager is likely to outperform the market." Levmore, supra note 24, at 650; see R. POSNER,
supra, at 416. Notwithstanding the verdict of all "sophisticated commentators," inves-
tors still seek out professional investing services. See, e.g.,Jeffrey M. Laderman, The Best
Return For the Least Risk: Our Mutual Fund Scoreboard Can Help You Pick a Winner, Bus.
WEEK, Feb. 20, 1989, at 80; Jeffrey M. Laderman, How Long Will Junk Be King of the Bond
Funds?: In 1988 the Fixed-Income Winners Were the High-Yielders, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 27, 1989,
at 114.
29 See WHLLiAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BusINESS ORGANIZATION AND FI-
NANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 268 (3d ed. 1988).
30 Information costs are the costs of acquiring information necessary for informed
investing. See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND Ex-
TENSIONS 214-18 (3d ed. 1985). For a discussion of how bond rating agencies reduce
investors' information costs, see supra note 12.
31 This is because investors seek to maximize their expected yield over the life of
the bond (present discounted expected value). A higher risk of loss lowers this return.
See W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, supra note 29, at 207-16. There are two components of risk.
The first is the risk that the market in general will move adversely (Beta). The second is
the risk that the particular security will move adversely, based on that security's own
characteristics, independently of the market (Alpha). The investor can minimize this
second risk by diversifying her portfolio of investments. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at
406; Coffee, supra note 23, at 748; infra note 35.
32 This Note assumes that the average investor is risk-averse. Thus, the investor
requires a higher return to invest in riskier securities. For a general discussion of risk,
risk-aversion, and expected utility maximization, see W. NICHOLSON, supra note 30, at
203-08; R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 406-13. For a critique of expected utility theory as a
valid predictor of human behavior, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect The-
ory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Mark J. Machina,
Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (1987).
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be too small to justify much investment.33 The returns are small
because the debenture landscape is so cluttered with differing issues
that risk evaluation is very difficult. Worse yet, most investors are
relatively unsophisticated in the techniques needed to evaluate the
riskiness of debenture issues. For this unsophisticated investor, the
optimum investment in gathering information is likely very low.
3 4
Even though she desires the added return that she might gain by
searching out profit opportunities where the marginal interest gain
outweighs the marginal increase in risk, the returns are not suffi-
cient to warrant a move from a risk-free investment such as Treasury
Bills.35
The issuing company, on the other hand, wishes to raise capital
for its projects at the lowest possible cost. A system with high infor-
mation costs forces the corporation to pay a large premium to en-
courage investors to invest in its bonds.3 6 These high premiums
drive up the costs of the issuer's best projects and may cause it to
33 The investor will continue to increase investment in research until the marginal
cost of doing so matches the marginal return. See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 30, at 327-
34.
34 The investor has alternatives to personal information searches. She may rely on
a professional portfolio investor to locate profit opportunities, or on research analysts at
brokerage firms. One problem with this strategy, however, is that many brokerages are
reducing the number of analysts they hire. See David B. Hilder & Barbara Donnelly,
Cutbacks Leave Gaps in Stock Research, Wall St.J., Apr. 26, 1990, at C1, col. 3. In addition,
these alternatives still result in duplicative analyses because many different researchers
each perform separate searches. Not only is this inefficient, but researchers also lack the
benefit of nonpublic information that sometimes is communicated to bond rating agen-
cies by the issuing companies. See infra note 43. One problem with relying on tradi-
tional analysts is that they often are not free from outside pressures. Because many
research departments rate clients of their firm's investment banking divisions, "analysts
who don't provide appropriate opinions can find themselves in the frying pan." Ellen E.
Schultz, Analysts Who Write Lukewarm Reports Sometimes Get Burned, Wall St.J., Apr. 5, 1990,
at Cl, col. 4. This perhaps is illustrated by a survey of 1500 companies which showed
that brokerage firms issued "buy" recommendations 44.6% of the time, "holds" 45.6%
of the time, and "sells" only 9.7% of the time. Id. at col. 5; see infra note 65.
35 Treasury Bills are nearly riskless because they have the full credit of the United
States Government behind them.
Investors also may decrease risk by buying diverse types of securities which have
uncorrelated riskiness. The randomly distributed risks tend to cancel out, and, if
enough securities are involved, the component of risk that is independent of large mar-
ket movements is nearly eliminated. See supra note 31. If markets are not completely
efficient, however, then "diversification is no longer the sole prudent investment strat-
egy." Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 27, at 800-02. In such a case, if the investor
actually can identify undervalued securities at a low cost, then she should selectively
invest in these. Id.; see also supra note 28.
36 A bond's interest rate premium has three components: the risk of inflation, the
opportunity cost of the capital, and the risk premium which compensates the investor for
the chance that she will not recover her principal. Id. An unrated issuing company must
sell its bonds for a lower price because of the higher perceived risk premium of an un-
rated bond.
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abandon certain marginal but still profitable projects.3 7 Further, the
issuer often cannot fight high information costs directly. Any at-
tempt to communicate to bond purchasers nonpublic information38
about the worthiness of the planned projects may fall into the hands
of the issuer's competitors, thereby lowering the potential returns to
the proposed project.3 9 The information costs of this poorly func-
tioning system lead to a poor allocation of resources away from
risky, but still valuable projects to less risky, but less valuable
projects.40
Bond rating agencies help minimize high information costs. By
specializing in information analysis, building confidential relation-
ships with issuing companies, and cultivating reputations for accu-
racy, bond rating agencies increase the capital markets' efficiency.
The investor who wishes to evaluate the riskiness of potential invest-
ments can consult specialists who can perform the evaluation at a
drastically lower cost than she can.4 1 At the same time, society
37 This poor allocation of resources causes trouble for both the issuer of the debt
and the investor in the securities. For the issuer, there is a needless transfer of wealth to
the bond holder, as well as a dead weight loss caused by projects not undertaken be-
cause of abnormally high capital input costs. If the market is selectively inefficient, with
information only for certain projects communicated to the market, the market may act
efficiently on the available information without choosing the project with the highest
real return. Such a market is allocatively inefficient. See id. at 768-69.
For the investor, incomplete information results in improper savings. Because the
real return on an investment includes a risk premium, the investor miscalculates the real
rate while investing. The investor, therefore, either misses profitable opportunities to
increase investment, or over-invests in projects where the real return is lower than ex-
pected. Such a market is speculatively inefficient. See id.
38 This Note uses the term "nonpublic information" instead of the more common
term "inside information" to distinguish this information from any connotation of ille-
gal activity. "Nonpublic information," as used in this Note, is merely information that
the market as a whole does not (yet) have.
The role of bond rating agencies in communicating nonpublic information to the
market without revealing its content is considered more fully later. See infra note 43 and
accompanying text.
39 Even if the firm communicates directly with the market, however, it may misrep-
resent its future prospects. Because of this problem, the firm will still hire a rating
agency even when it could communicate with potential investors without revealing data
to competitors. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 614-15.
40 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 673 ("A world with fraud, or without
adequate truthful information, is a world with too little investment, and in the wrong
things to boot."); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 602 ("Poor quality information
drives higher quality information from the market.").
A system such as the one described introduces a second risk component. The nor-
mal component, the risk that the issuer will not repay the principal, is still present.
However, an additional component, the risk that the corporation is misrepresenting the
value of the proposed project, is added. Investors require a risk-premium for this risk,
too, and hence are only willing to pay a lower price for these bonds. See Ederington &
Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 24.
41 See MooDY's ON MUNICIPALS, supra note 1, at 2. Another function of the bond
rating agency, other than providing economies of specialization, is to verify the informa-
tion that the corporation has decided to release to the market. Thus, if a high rating of a
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avoids the potentially wasteful resources that duplicative risk analy-
sis by individual investors causes.42 Finally, by divulging the infor-
mation to the rating agency, the issuing corporation can
communicate nonpublic information to the market without alerting
competitors. The rating agency then can consider the information
when formulating its rating.
43
corporation's debt accompanies the corporation's assertions of its own secure financial
base, the market is reassured of the integrity of the firm's representations. The bond
rating agencies are trusted because they are third parties with no interest in misrepre-
senting the state of the corporation's finances, and because the rating agency puts its
reputation and its prior investments in a ratings infrastructure on the line every time it
makes a rating. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 601, 604-05. Bond rating
agencies do not endorse this interpretation, however. See S & P RATINGS CRITERIA, supra
note 1, at 3-4.
42 Any investor will invest resources in procuring information so long as the margi-
nal benefits that accrue to her exceed the marginal costs. This individually rational be-
havior causes net waste, however. "From a social welfare perspective, trading gains do
not create additional wealth; one party's gain comes at the other party's loss, whereas
the process of researching and verifying securities information consumes real re-
sources." Coffee, supra note 23, at 733. The benefit to society of more than one individ-
ual performing the risk calculus is only equal to the cost of communicating the
information from the first analyst to the others-an amount much less than the re-
sources required to perform duplicative analyses. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23,
at 681-82. Thus, "it may be more efficient for a few specialists to undertake [bond rat-
ing] and sell summaries of their evaluations in the form of ratings than for all prospec-
tive bond purchasers to conduct their own analyses." Ederington, supra note 15, at 37-
38.
If one views an undervalued security as an unrecovered treasure, the problem is
very similar to the old economic problem underlying recovery of bullion lost at sea. If
more than the efficient number of searchers mount expeditions to recover sunken ships,
society's resources are wasted. Under the common law, the first searcher had the right
to prevent others from interfering with her search. However, this solution does not
transfer well to the case of overallocation of resources to securities research; unlike ship-
wrecks, it is impossible to establish defined areas of securities research. See R. POSNER,
supra note 28, at 35. But cf Coffee, supra note 23, at 733 n.45 ("Indeed, society might
rationally decide to pay analysts not to engage in rival research efforts where the re-
sources so utilized would only affect the distribution of trading gains and not increase
market efficiency.").
43 "Unless people who offer the 'better securities' .. can distinguish themselves
from others, investors will view all securities as average. Higher quality securities will
sell at prices lower than they would if information were available costlessly, and there
will be too little investment in good ventures." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at
673-74.
For example, suppose a corporation wishes to raise capital to exploit a recent tech-
nological breakthrough but fears that doing so will tip off competitors. The corporation
can use a rating agency to circumvent this problem. The company can confidentially
meet with an independent rating agency, transmit the information, and secure a higher
rating for its bonds. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 604-05 ("In many such
cases, outside specialists acting as information intermediaries will offer their own reputa-
tion in lieu of the sellers' as a bond of quality .... [I]n the financial markets, the most
obvious example is the role played by rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's and
Moody's.").
The rating agency will keep the information confidential because the costs of leak-
ing the information substantially outweigh the benefits of doing so. Lawsuits for agency
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This centralization of research saves resources. Bond rating
agencies, which have gained expertise through specialization, ana-
lyze issues less expensively than individual investors, help to avoid
costly, duplicative research, and benefit from economies of scale.44
Furthermore, bond rating agencies disseminate information to the
market very quickly and thereby facilitate rapid market
adjustments. 45
Standard & Poor's Corp. and Moody's Investor's Service, Inc.
are the major United States bond rating agencies. 46 These agencies,
relying on both public and private information, analyze financial
data and distill it into a concise symbolic representation of the
probability that the rated security will default.47 This information
trading on confidential information would quickly dry up future business. See Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 688; cf. Fischel, supra note 12, at 1052.
Several researchers have suggested this role for ratings agencies. See Ederington,
supra note 15, at 38 ("Since the rating agencies claim to receive non-public information
which is held in confidence, ratings may also provide a means of communicating relevant
aspects of this 'inside' information to bond purchasers without revealing the details to
the market-the firm's competitors in particular."); Paul A. Griffin & Antonio Z. San-
vicente, Common Stock Returns and Rating Change: A Methodological Comparison, 37 J. FIN.
103 (1982). But see Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 24 ("Unfortunately, the
nature of inside information makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine its true
importance in the rating process.").
Similarly, accountants serve as information intermediaries. They also use their own
independently cultivated reputation for accuracy to reduce the cost of investors' verify-
ing the quality of the firm's disclosures. See Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kracaw,
Information Production, Market Signaling, and the Theoy of Financial Intermediation, 35 J. FIN.
863, 864 (1980) ("Our hypothesis is that intermediaries emerge as information produ-
cers because the production of information, the protection of confidentiality, the provi-
sion of transaction services, are naturally complimentary activities."); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 23, at 688.
44 Cf Coffee, supra note 23, at 724 (significant economies of scale associated with
stock and bond analysis).
45 The most recent example of this is the response of the market to the down grad-
ing of RJR-Nabisco's debt. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4. As Business Week
notes, "pronouncements by rating agencies are scuttling billion-dollar deals and de-
pressing bond prices." Zigas, supra note 4, at 106. Such market reaction illustrates the
importance of bond rating agencies. As Professor Coffee writes:
[C]ritical information is not being disclosed to investors. Most ob-
servers would agree with this statement, but the neoclassical theorist will
respond that little information need reach investors because they are pro-
tected instead by the bond rating agencies-Moody's or Standard and
Poor's; these agencies digest the relevant information, which in the case
of a debt security consists only of its risk level, and assign a rating to each
security.
Coffee, supra note 23, at 745; cf supra note 28.
46 Although Standard & Poor's and Moody's are the two primary debt raters, three
smaller firms, Fitch; Duff & Phelps; and McCarthy, Crisanti & Maffie, also rate debt.
This Note, however, focuses on Standard & Poor's and Moody's as representative
agencies.
47 Standard & Poor's uses a rating system of ten grades ranging from AAA to D for
its bonds. Debt rated AAA, AA, or A has a strong capacity to pay interest and repay
principal, with AAA being the strongest. Debt rated BBB has an adequate capacity to
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then is packaged and sold to investors who use it in formulating
their own investment strategies.
The rating is a critical component in the average investor's in-
vestment strategy.48 In fact, under the prudent man rule, managers
of many fiduciary funds are not allowed to invest in low rated "junk
bonds." 49 Still, the importance of the bond rating easily might be
pay interest and principal, and is the lowest ranking of investment grade debt. Debt
rated BB or lower falls into the so-called "junk bond" category, and is considered to be
a speculative investment. Debt rated C is debt on which no interest is being paid, and
debt rated D is in default. Ratings from AA to B may be modified by the addition of a
plus or minus to show its relative standing within the category. S & P DEBT RATINGS
CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 10. Standard & Poor's uses a slightly different system for
rating commercial paper (bonds with a term of less than 270 days). Id. at 43.
Moody's uses a system of seven grades running form Aaa to Caa for its bonds. Debt
rated Aaa or Aa is a high quality investment grade. Debt rated A or Baa is a medium
grade obligation that is currently secure, but might be susceptible to future changes.
Debt rated Ba and B is considered to be uncertain. Finally, bonds rated Caa, Ca, or C
are of poor standing, and bonds rated C may be in actual default. The numbers 1, 2,
and 3 may be appended to a grade between Aa through B, with 1 indicating that it is a
security near the top of its category, 2 average, and 3 below. MooDY'S BOND RECORD,
supra note 10, at 1.
48 However, even a top rating
is not a recommendation to purchase, sell or hold a particular security.
The rating performs the isolated function of credit risk evaluation, which
is only one element of the entire investment decisionmaking process. A
rating cannot constitute a recommendation inasmuch as it does not take
into consideration other factors, such as market price and risk preference
of the investor.
S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 3. Similarly, Moody's cautions that its
ratings "have no value in forecasting the direction of future trends of market price."
MOODY'S ON MUNICIPAS, supra note 1, at 49. It further notes that "[t]he attractiveness of
a given bond may depend on its yield, its maturity date, or other factors for which the
investor may search, as well as on its investment quality, the only characteristic to which
the rating refers." Id.; cf Coffee, supra note 23, at 745. For example, all issues by a
company are rated similarly, even though the maturities of the company's issues may
vary substantially. Longer duration bonds are riskier than short term bonds. Thus,
even the same company's bonds' riskiness may vary, yet still have the same rating. See
James H. Downs, Time-The Enemy of a Company's Quality Rating, TR. & EST., Aug., 1982,
at 23.
49 This per se rule against investing in low-grade bonds does not make economic
sense. A well-diversified portfolio of independently risky junk bonds is not necessarily
more volatile than investment grade bonds. In fact, on average, Treasury bond prices
are roughly twice as volatile as junk bonds. Bencivenga & Millison, supra note 28, at 10.
The prudent man rule, formulated in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.)
446 (1830), originally was conceived as a flexible rule dictating the standard governing a
fiduciary in charge of investing another's assets. However, courts and the Restatement
have ossified the rule into a restrictive notion of prudent investing. See, e.g., First Ala-
bama Bank of Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938
(1983) (Despite expert testimony that five of the thirty stocks comprising the DowJones
Industrial Average did not meet strict prudence criteria for investment safety, invest-
ment in an undervalued, less well-known stock was considered imprudent.). Thus,
nearly one and a half trillion dollars worth of assets-more than half the value of the
entire New York Stock Exchange-is managed in an economically inefficient fashion.
BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 3-5 (1988).
For an excellent discussion of the infirmities of the prudent man rule, see B. LONG-
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overstated. Both Standard & Poor's and Moody's stress that they do
not normally undertake investigative work of their own. 50 Rather,
sTRETH, supra; see also John Lennon & Paul McCartney, "Dear Prudence," The Beatles,
(Columbia Records 1968) (detailing the Beatles's objections to the prudent man rule).
The members of the Beatles were well known advocates in the fight to abolish the
prudent man-they called him a real "No Where Man." By ignoring the dictates of
prudent investing, they were able to amass sizeable fortunes. They also wrote numerous
songs in the fight to adopt a better set of fiduciary management rules, including "ERISA
in the Sky with Diamonds," "A Day in the Life of a Trust Fund Manager, .... The Ballad
ofJohn and Yoko's Money," "Back in the ERISA," and, of course, "Dear Prudence," an
open letter to their mutual fund director, which later was set to music and became a hit
in A major. In addition, they wrote numerous songs giving investment tips to the rec-
ord-buying public. "Penny Lane" was a nostalgic look back on the penny stocks, while
"Magical Mystery Bourse" touted the advantages of investing on the Tokyo stock ex-
change.
"I'll Follow the SUN," which outlined John's contrarian strategy of investing based
on the acronym, Stocks Undervalued Now, was the first major work questioning the
strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. George Harrison, too, was a rock
economist: for example, "While my Accountant Gently Weeps" outlined his despair at
seeing his prudently invested trust funds losing their value. Even Ringo Starrjoined the
crusade for a better prudent man rule, recording "She's 16, She's Beautiful, and She's
Mine," which told the story of his investment in Lockheed, which he bought at exactly
one-fourth of its previous high of 64. The contrarian investment later soared.
Although the Beatles later broke up because of a fight over whether they should
invest in tax-free municipals or high-growth equity investments, John Lennon and Paul
McCartney did see eye-to-eye on the need for a better prudence standard. John Lennon
released the poignant "Imagine," which painted the idyllic world where economics and
efficiency would be the goal of all people, in the investment world or elsewhere. His
words, as meaningful today as they were a decade and a half ago, were:
Imagine there's no prudence,
It isn't hard to do,
No U.S. bonds for us,
Higher returns too.
Imagine all the people,
Investing for today.
You may think I'm a dreamer,
But I'm not the only one,
We hope someday you'll join us,
With alphas over one.
A cold realist, John also released the haunting "Cold Turkey," the story of his agony
when his subscription to the Wall Street Journal was inadvertently cut off due to post office
error.
It is time to acknowledge the contribution of these young millionaires to the finan-
cial scene. Although their music no longer tops the charts, their investment strategies
still top the financial charts. Every fund manager today owes these visionary rock econo-
mists an enormous debt that she cannot hope to repay, even with high-yielding, impru-
dent junk bonds.
50 "mhe rating does not... attest to the authenticity of the information provided
by the issuer and upon which the rating may be based." S & P DEBT RAINGS CRITERIA,
supra note 1, at 3. Standard & Poor's evaluates the data presented only to "determine
whether the numbers and ratios overstate or understate the financial performance and
position of the firm relative to its competitors." STANDARD & POOR'S, INC., CREDIT OvER-
VIEW: CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL RATINGS 27 (1983) (emphasis in original). Fur-
ther, Standard & Poor's cautions in every issue of CreditWeek that "because of the
possibility of human or mechanical error by our sources, CreditWeek or others, CreditWeek
does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or completeness of any information and is
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they rely on public information and information provided to them
by the rated company itself.51 While the agencies do analyze the
data to ensure that it conforms with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, 52 they do not independently seek to verify the informa-
tion.53 In short, while the rating is a distilled, independent judg-
ment as to the creditworthiness of a particular debt issue, it is not an
audit. The information is an important part of an investor's infor-
mation, but it does not by itself provide a quick route to high, risk-
free returns.
Despite the rating agencies' disclaimers, investors still rely on
the ratings to a considerable extent.54 Moreover, despite the fact
that the "rating agencies have become quasi-public bodies [with] a
direct impact on the amount of interest that issuing corporations
and governmental bodies must pay," 55 they are largely unregulated.
Even the tort system, often used to monitor wrongdoing in other
unregulated areas, has little effect on rating agencies.
5 6
To date, lawmakers and courts generally have imposed only a
not responsible for any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from use of such
information." S & P CREDITWEEK, supra note 10, at 2. Moody's similarly notes that
"[t]he information herein has been obtained from sources believed to be accurate and
reliable, but because of the possibility of human and mechanical error its accuracy or
completeness is not guaranteed." MOODY'S BOND RECORD, supra note 10, at 1.
51 See supra note 7 for a description of the information that rating agencies usually
require.
52 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") are established by the
American Institute of Certified Accountants. Auditors may issue unqualified opinions
only when the method of accounting accords with GAAP. See AMERICAN INSTrUTE OF
CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS
§ 509.28 (1986).
The presence of uniform accounting standards does not mean that all audits are
equally accurate, however. Different ways of approaching the same problem can result
in different audits. Companies occasionally will employ another auditor when their cur-
rent auditor refuses to treat their information favorably. See Daniel L. Goelzer, The SEC
and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in the Changing Regulation of the Accounting Profession, 52
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1057, 1058 n.1 (1987) ("According to the 1985 Annual Auditor
Change Report, 542 public companies changed accountants in 1985, an increase of 82%
from 1981. More specifically, 19% of the companies that changed accountants did so
after an opinion concerning the company's financial statements was qualified or dis-
claimed."); Note, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate America's Search for the Perfect
Auditor, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1077 (1987) (authored by MindyJ. Smolevitz).
53 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 24.
54 "Owing to the notable lack of information available to investors... ratings have
doubtless played too important a role in investors' decision making process." PEACOCK,
A REVIEW OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES AND THEIR STATUS UNDER THE LAW 2037, 2040 n.22
(1976); see also Pinches & Singleton, supra note 1, at 42.
55 H. SHERWOOD, supra note 7, at 143; see D. HAWKINS, B. BROWN, & W. CAMPBELL,
supra note 1, at 15.
56 This is because it is very difficult to recover against a rating agency under the
current recklessness standard which applies to rating agencies. Part II infra discusses the
relative merits of recklessness and negligence regimes.
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recklessness standard on bond rating agencies.5 7 Although the
agencies are free to contractually set a stricter standard of care, they
have not done so. The agencies instead have attempted to walk a
narrow line, for they must keep the respect of all market partici-
pants, including both the rated companies and the agencies' sub-
scribers. The agencies are operated as completely independent
subsidiaries of their parent corporations, with "Chinese Walls" er-
ected to prevent any data from the rating agencies from reaching
other parts of the company.58 Neither Standard & Poor's nor
Moody's invest in the holdings that they rate.59 All possible actions
are taken to preserve the lifeline of the rating agencies' business,
their continuing reputation for accuracy.
60
II
AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF EXPANDING LIABILITY
"[A Standard & Poor's] rating is not a recommendation to
purchase, sell or hold a security inasmuch as it does not comment
as to market price, market supply or investor preference and
suitability."'
't
A. Bond Rating Agencies and the Need for Judicial Oversight
Before considering whether lawmakers should expand rating
agency liability to cover negligent actions, it is interesting to note
that, absent any legal intervention whatsoever, market forces may be
sufficient to regulate rating agencies in and of themselves. Bond
rating agencies face significant economic pressures which force
them toward the proper level of care.
A bond rating agency such as Moody's faces competitive pres-
sures from several fronts. First, and most obviously, other rating
agencies covet Moody's business, and seek to gain a competitive ad-
vantage by providing their subscribers with more accurate products.
Second, there are several close substitutes for rating agency serv-
ices, such as in-house technical analysts whose services many securi-
57 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERA, supra note 1, at 3; see also MOODY'S ON MUNICIPALS,
supra note 1, at 2; S & P RATINGS GUIDE, supra note 13, at 4. But see Smith, supra note 17
(arguing that courts could, consistent with the first amendment, impose liability on me-
dia defendants for negligently published words).
58 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 5; S & P RATINGS GUIDE, supra
note 13, at 17.
59 See S & P RATINGS GUIDE, supra note 13, at 2.
60 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 3. The publication also notes that
"[r]atings are of value only so long as they are credible. Credibility arises primarily from
the objectivity which results from the rater being independent of the issuer's business."
ld; see also S & P RATINGS GUIDE, supra note 13, at 2.
61 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRmTERA, supra note 1, at iii.
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ties firms offer to both their clients and their own internal investors.
Finally, the ratings firm is unlike the traditional manufacturer, which
may have difficulty communicating its product safety information to
the marketplace. The performance of rating agencies can be moni-
tored by the simple method of correlating past ratings with actual
defaults. 6
2
Simply put, the bond rating agency sells its reputation along
with every rating. As Professor Siliciano has stated the problem in
the area of accountant liability,
[e]ven absent any liability rules, accountants would have a sig-
nificant economic stake in establishing and maintaining a reputa-
tion for conducting good audits. This positive incentive works on
at least two levels. The typical client, for its own internal monitor-
ing purposes, will insist on a careful audit; accountants who fail to
meet this standard will not be retained. Similarly, accounting
firms with a reputation for care will enhance the client's prospects
of obtaining credit on reasonable terms from outside parties.
These factors suggest that accounting firms with an interest in
permanence and growth will audit with care.63
The very value of an agency's ratings, like an accountant's opinions,
lies in their independent, reliable evaluation of a company's finan-
cial data. Moreover, the arguments which militate against the recent
expansion of accountant liability are even stronger in the rating
agency arena. While a poor audit may be difficult to detect (except
in the rare occurences when the company actually goes bankrupt
and its books are opened to all in bankruptcy court), a rating is
much more visible. The ratings are published weekly, and eagerly
tracked by both financial experts and academicians.64
Furthermore, rating agencies provide more checks on each
other than do rival accounting firms. It is very common for several
rating agencies to rate the same issuance, which means that it is im-
mediately possible for a competitor to demonstrate its superior
analysis, should a rival firm make a mistake. The market not only
will punish poorly performing firms, but will do so swiftly.65
As a threshold matter, therefore, it is not at all apparent that any
62 For a sampling of some of these studies, see infra notes 121-24 and accompany-
ing text. For some examples of the increasing competition in bond ratings, see infra
note 125.
63 Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1953.
64 See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
65 Perhaps the greatest value of a bond rating agency lies in its independence from
outside interests. Lately, there has been some criticism of analysts at security firms, who
often are under pressure to give positive recommendations. See Schultz, supra note 34,
at Cl. These conflicting pressures on the typical securities firm analyst are illustrated by
the recent case of a Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. analyst who was fired after Donald
Trump threatened to sue the firm because of one of its analyst's comments. See id.
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system of regulation is needed for the regulation of bond rating
agencies. This discussion, of course, raises another question: if rat-
ing agencies are so accurate, then what do they have to fear from
courtrooms? The next subsections of this Note consider the costs of
imposing a negligence regime on bond rating agencies, and demon-
strate why an expansion of rating agency liability would impose sig-
nificant costs on rating agencies without significantly increasing
rating agency accuracy.
B. Economics and Negligence in the Rating Context
As Part H1(A) of this Note demonstrates, the market system itself
already imposes strong incentives on a bond rating agency to es-
chew negligent conduct. This, however, does not end debate. The
current movement in the law is toward a more relaxed definition of
privity and looser standards of care for centralized producers,
whether they produce tangible products or intangible services such
as information. Although the above discussion is relevant when dis-
cussing the optimum level of care in the abstract, it is unlikely that
bond rating agency liability ever will be left strictly to market forces.
Given that some form of judicial oversight is likely to remain a per-
manent fixture for the foreseeable future, the question remains as to
how strenuous this oversight should be.
The publication of a bond rating agency currently is treated as
are any other publications under the first amendment. 66 A bond rat-
ing agency thus is not liable for negligent misrepresentations unless
its mistaken advice reaches the level of reckless disregard for the
truth.67 This heightened standard differs from recent developments
in other areas of the law.68 For example, the Second Restatement of
Torts would allow recovery for "negligent misrepresentation" by all
people in the class of persons that the provider of the information
knows will reasonably rely on the information.69 This standard is
66 See infra notes 138-94 and accompanying text.
67 This language is from traditional first amendment cases. See St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Many courts, however, have
applied similar principles to rating agencies. See supra note 16 for cases applying the
first amendment to publishers of financial data.
68 See, e.g., Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974) (abstractor lia-
ble for negligent misrepresentation to all parties that could have been reasonably fore-
seen); International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927) (bailor
liable for giving negligent instructions to bailee), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927); Shat-
terproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountant liable
for certifying audits that it knew would be relied upon by creditors). But cf Stephen K. v.
Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980) (false representation that
unmarried sexual partner was using birth control pills not actionable).
69 Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
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followed by many courts. 70
Accountants and attorneys once enjoyed widespread immunity
from many negligent misrepresentation suits. 71 Many courts, how-
§ 552: Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transac-
tions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their jus-
tifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (i)
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the in-
formation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit
the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to
protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). This section on negligent misrepresen-
tation covers only cases in which information is negligently supplied; section 311 covers
negligent misrepresentation that results in physical harm, id § 311, while other sections
cover liability for negligently supplying chattels that imperil another's property or per-
son. Id. 88 388-402.
Section 551 also imposes liability for nondisclosure of a material fact; however, this
only applies if the party was under a duty to the other "to exercise reasonable care to
disclose the matter in question." Id. § 551.
70 See generally W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID B.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 747 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]
("Thus, liability has not in fact been extended much beyond that indicated in the Second
Restatement of Torts, if any.").
As Dean Prosser notes, "[t]he shift on the whole [in tort law] has been heavily to-
ward the side of the plaintiff, with expanded liability in nearly every area." Id. at xxi.
Courts allow recovery for negligent misrepresentation because they have decided that as
between the innocent third party and the negligent misrepresenter, it is better that the
innocent party recover her losses. See, e.g., Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Russo v. Williams, 160 Neb. 564, 71 N.W.2d 131 (1955).
71 See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Badische
Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d 198 (1987); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395
(Iowa 1969); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1977); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d
212 (1982); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
For years, accountant liability was governed by the standard of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In that case, Judge Cardozo denied the
plaintiff recovery on his negligence claim, even though he found the auditors negligent
and knew creditors such as Ultramares would rely on the certified balance sheets. Id at
170-71. Cardozo noted that:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business con-
ducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw
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ever, have expanded accountant liability, relying on such economic
rationales as risk-spreading and least cost-avoider. 72 The following
may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes [auditors] to these
consequences.
Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. This remains the law in many jurisdictions, including
New York. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483
N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (accountant not liable to non-contractual parties for inac-
curate financial reports), order amended, 66 N.Y.2d 812, 489 N.E.2d 249, 488 N.Y.S.2d
362 (1985) (dismissal of fraud cause of action without prejudice).
Curiously, Judge Cardozo also was the first judge to author an opinion holding
someone liable to a third party for economic loss caused by giving false information.
The case was Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), and he and the
New York Court of Appeals majority found that a public weigher who had given the
incorrect weight of beans was liable to a relying third party despite the lack of privity.
Meanwhile, the emphasis in tort law moved to compensating innocent parties. As
Dean Prosser states, "[a]n honest blunder... may absolve [the defendant] from moral
blame, but the harm to others is still as great, and the actor's individual standards must
give way to those of the public." WILLtAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
146 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted); see also PROSSER, supra note 70, at xxi.
The Restatement reflects this concern for innocent parties. Even under the Restate-
ment, however, liability is not unlimited. For the accountant to be held liable, the client
would have to notify her that a party would be relying on her work. This is the case even
if the auditor "knows that the financial statements ... are customarily used in a wide
variety of financial transactions by the corporation and that they may be relied upon by
lenders, investors, shareholders, creditors [and] purchasers ... in numerous possible
kinds of transactions." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 illustration 10 (1977).
Thus, the Restatement is not as broad as some of the more recent accountant liability
cases. For the text of the Restatement, see supra note 69.
Limited attorney liability also is under attack. The Supreme Court previously had
mirrored the language of Cardozo's Ultramares decision in National Say. Bank v. Ward,
100 U.S. 195 (1879), which held that the attorney is not liable for negligent actions to
other than his client, absent special circumstances. Newer cases attack this limited priv-
ity. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946
(1985); Ingram Indus. Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (lawyer
may be liable to third party based on wanton and reckless misstatement). See generally
Leslie Gardner, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corporate Opinion Letters, 64 B.U.L. REv.
415,422-33 (1984);Jerold S. Solovy, Ronald L. Marmer, ThomasJ. McCarthy & Mark A.
Dupont, Potential Liability of Attorneys in Securities Transactions, 335 PLI/Lrr. 621 (1987).
72 See, e.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 644 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ind. 1986),
aff'd, 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 56 Bankr. 936 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1986), aft'd, 59 Bankr. 329 (1986); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367,
199 S.E.2d 564 (1973).
For cases with expansive definitions of who may recover, see, e.g., International
Mortgage Co. v.John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr.
218 (1986) (construed in Nicolos v. Grover, 186 Cal. App. 3d 858, 231 Cal. Rptr. 79
(1986)) (certified public report of an accountant is intended for public reliance); H. Ro-
senblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983); see also Leonard P. Novello,
Current Developments in Accountant's Liability, 335 PLI/Lrr. 463 (1987) (compendium of
cases).
Many commentators advocate expanding tort liability for accountants, despite the
dubious economic logic of some of their arguments. See, e.g., Albert 0. Besser, Privity?-
An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SroN HALL 507 (1976);
Kenneth I. Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to the
Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 56 (1968); Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the
Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983);
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subsections analyze the economic arguments for and against apply-
ing a negligent misrepresentation standard to bond rating agencies
and conclude that economic reasoning favors retaining the current
recklessness standard rather than expanding liability to cover negli-
gent behavior.
1. The Case for a Negligence Standard
The premise of the economic arguments favoring use of a negli-
gent misrepresentation standard for bond rating agencies is that
holding rating agencies liable for their negligence will increase the
accuracy of their analyses. This argument assumes that the rating
agency can avoid mistakes more cheaply than can the investor,73 and
that without the negligence standard, the rating agency would main-
tain a less than optimum amount of care. If a rating agency is liable
for mistakes where the cost of avoiding the mistake is less than the
benefits, it will increase its investment in accuracy until the marginal
return of doing so is just equal to the marginal cost.74 The rating
agency will increase its investment in care until it no longer is
negligent.
a. Least-cost avoider rationale
In general, the tort system imposes liability on the least-cost
avoider of mistakes.7 5 The system thus encourages the party who
can most inexpensively avoid the harm to take steps to avoid mis-
Note, Accountants' Liability for Negligence-A Contemporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48
FORDHAm L. REV. 401 (1979) (authored byJudah Septimus); Note, Tort Law--The Enlarg-
ing Scope of Auditors' Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 281 (1983)
(authored by Mark D. Boveri & Brent E. Marshall). But see Fischel, supra note 12;
Siliciano, supra note 18; Comments, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Exten-
sion of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675 (1971) (authored by Joseph R. Dawson).
73 A recent case in this area asserts that the investor, not the rating agency, is re-
sponsible for checking the substantive accuracy of a publication before investing, rea-
soning that the information in an investment publication is not a substitute for a
prospectus. First Equity III, 869 F.2d at 180 ("[W]e believe that a user is in the best
position to weigh the danger of inaccuracy and potential loss arising from a particular
use of a summary against the cost of verifying the summary by examination of the origi-
nal documents or prospectus."). The First Equity cases are more fully explored infra in
notes 144-58.
74 R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 147-51, 160-63.
75 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 312 (1970); R. POSNER, upra
note 28, at 148-60. Furthermore, before courts allow recovery for the defendant's negli-
gence, they examine whether the plaintiff also has been negligent. If the defendant can
show this, then the courts either reduce recovery (comparative negligence), or disallow
recovery entirely (contributory negligence). This forces each economic actor to take the
optimal amount of care to avoid accidents. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 148-60.
In cases of negligent misrepresentation, the Restatement adopts a contributory neg-
ligence standard while specifically reserving comment on the recent trend of imposing
comparative negligence in lieu of contributory negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552A comment b (1977); see also Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886
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takes.76 As between the investor and the bond rating agency, this
party is likely to be the rating agency. Bond rating requires special-
ized knowledge and capabilities which most investors do not pos-
sess. 77 In addition, because bond rating agencies have established
symbiotic relationships with frequent issuers who need to communi-
cate inside information to the markets, they often possess confiden-
tial information not available to the market as a whole.78 Finally, the
costs to an investor of playing detective are much greater than they
are for the rating agency, as the agency has better expertise to spot
mistakes. Because tort law generally takes the position that the risk
of loss should be imposed on the party best able to avoid it, this
analysis, absent more, would argue for imposing liability on the
bond rating agencies. 79 Thus, because bond rating agencies can
best avoid mistakes, courts relying only on the least-cost avoider ra-
tionale would impose liability on the agencies.
b. The optimum level of care rationale
Proponents of increased liability for financial intermediaries be-
lieve that expanded liability will provide "a financial disincentive for
socially unreasonable conduct."' 0 In theory, this point is perfectly
valid. In a world of perfect information, consumers would discount
the product of the firm that slips into the negligence zone through
inefficiency or underinvestment in accuracy. As the product of a
bond rating agency becomes less accurate, it becomes less valuable
to investors, who would either turn to competitors or near substi-
tutes, conduct more research on their own, or simply become less
willing to pay the full price for the now less accurate product. The
firms, in turn, would be forced to discount their product to reflect
their below-optimum investment in accuracy. The agency would
either have to increase its investment or lose market share as com-
petitors market a more accurate product. In the real world of signif-
icant information costs, however, a rating agency will invest in
(1981) (history and comparison of the development of contributory and comparative
negligence).
Judge Posner notes that "[c]omparative negligence makes economic sense only
when society wants to use the tort system to provide insurance to accident victims, be-
cause it gives the careless victim of a careless injurer something .. " He then observes
that in an era of widely available market insurance, why "there should be a desire to
provide insurance through the tort system is a mystery to the positive economic theorist
of the common law." R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 157-58.
76 R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 148-60.
77 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 43.
79 A similar approach is that the risk of loss should fall on the party best able to
insure against the loss. This also is likely to be the bond rating agency.
80 Weiner, supra note 72, at 256.
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accuracy only until the marginal cost of doing so equals the increase
in marginal revenue achieved by greater accuracy. The bond rating
agency will consider that it can make a certain number of negligent
errors through underinvestment in accuracy of which the market
will not learn, or which will be reflected in a marginal change in
revenue that is less than the savings from not investing in an optimal
level of accuracy. 8' In such a case, underinvestment in accuracy
(planned negligence) is a rational profit-maximizing strategy.
Because of imperfect information, negligence proponents
would argue, imposing a negligence standard might increase the
standard of care that the bond rating agencies will supply.8 2 For any
degree of negligence, the agency would have to consider whether it
is opening itself up to potential liability. Imposing these costs on
the firm would serve to internalize the costs of the negligence, and
thus create an incentive for the firm to act in a non-negligent
manner.
c. Risk-spreading rationale
Another argument often used for imposing tort liability on cen-
tralized manufacturers is the risk-spreading rationale.8 3 This theory
maintains that if courts hold rating firms liable for negligence, then
the firms will internalize all costs within the price that the firms
charge for their services. The bond rating agency will charge higher
prices, and out of these higher prices the agency will compensate
innocent relying parties.
The firm can pass these increased costs on to consumers to the
extent that supply is elastic and demand is inelastic.84 The more
willing consumers are to absorb the increased costs of bond rating,
and the less willing bond rating agencies are to bear them, the more
costs the bond rating agencies will pass downstream to consum-
81 The returns on negligent behavior may be high when the negligent firm takes
only a few sales from many competitors. No competitor will have sufficient incentive to
take action to prevent the lost sales. Even if they do act, the process is not instantane-
ous; in the interim, the negligent firm might make enough extra profit to make the negli-
gence worthwhile. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 98.
82 Judge Posner notes:
If compensation is the only purpose of the negligence system, it is a
poor system, being both costly and incomplete. Its economic function,
however, is not compensation but the deterrence of inefficient accidents.
If the system yields substantial savings in accident costs, its heavy admin-
istrative costs, which relate primarily to the determination of liability-
the determination whether the accident was uneconomical-may be
justified.
Id. at 187.
83 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
84 See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 30, at 173.
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ers.8 5 Those firms that are more negligent than their competitors
will have higher costs to pass on. These underinvesting firms will be
forced to bring their investment in accuracy closer to the optimal
level. If they do not, then they will lose business to competitors who
do.
In addition, because bond rating agencies derive much of their
income from charging bond issuers a fee for rating their bonds, 6
the bond rating agencies will have an incentive to charge higher
prices to those clients who misrepresent their finances or give poor
data to the agency. By doing so, the bond rating agencies will en-
courage bond issuers to give the rating agencies the most accurate
information possible. Failure to provide accurate information will
increase the bond issuer's costs of raising capital.8 7 Thus, the rating
agencies will pass on in an economically efficient manner the costs
of negligence to those firms who have in the past given sub-opti-
mum information, or who now appear to be concealing material in-
formation. The result, according to proponents of expanded
liability, will be more accurate information from the least-cost prov-
85 "The amount of passing on depends on the elasticity of demand. The more elas-
tic the demand, the smaller the fraction of the overcharge that will be passed on ... 
R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 194 n.2.
86 Standard & Poor's instituted user fees in the early 1970s; Moody's did so in
1969. Today, the user fees have become important enough that "the users of the ratings
(investors) do not incur the major costs" of ratings. Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5,
ch. 23, at 19. The fees for Moody's range from $1,000 to $125,000, MOODY'S BOND
RECORD, Oct. 1988, vol. 55, no. 10, while the fees for a Standard & Poor's rating gener-
ally range from $2,500 to $50,000. The smaller rating agencies, however, usually do not
charge user fees; only after the market has accepted the ratings as valuable can rating
agencies convince security issuers to pay them for their services. Ederington & Yawitz,
supra note 5, ch. 23, at 19.
Although the fact that a fee is charged does not imply that the bond rat-
ing agencies are biased (such a presumption would also disqualify under-
writers and attorneys, who are similarly paid by their clients), their
position is different from that of the securities analyst who looks primarily
to the investor for his compensation. Thus, there is a relative difference
in the degree of disinterestedness.
Coffee, supra note 23, at 746 n.83; but see supra notes 34 & 65 (noting that analysts often
are under pressure to change unfavorable ratings). However, the agencies have taken
every step to protect their reputations. For example, in 1969 Standard & Poor's down-
graded the debt of its parent, McGraw-Hill, Inc.
The payment of fees to the bond rating agencies is voluntary, as is supplying infor-
mation. However, if the company chooses to pay the fee and requests one of the major
agencies to rate its bonds, then it must give the information mentioned supra note 7.
Most rated companies choose to pay this voluntary fee, as this allows them to present
their case to the bond rating agency, and possibly to appeal a low rating. The cost of the
fee apparently is less than the present discounted expected cost of a lower rating, espe-
cially if the company is risk averse. Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 19.
87 This is especially true for multiple users of rating agency services. Because of
their future need for a bond rating agency's services, potentially fraudulent issuers must
consider not only the possible gains from fraud on this transaction, but also the dis-
counted future costs of higher fees.
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iders of the information, the rated companies themselves.88
2. The Case for Retaining a Recklessness Standard
Courts have used many of the above arguments to expand lia-
bility in other areas of tort law, such as accountant liability.89 This
expansion of liability, however, is troubling from an economic view-
point. This Note does not discuss whether the expansion of ac-
countant liability was proper.90 This Note instead will show that
many factors are unique to bond rating agencies, such as the relative
ease with which agency mistakes may be monitored, which means
that imposing a system of negligence will drive up rating costs while
yielding little increase in rating accuracy.
a. The cost of defensive rating
The first cost of imposing liability for negligence is the "paper
trail." To avoid liability, a rating agency will have to do more than
simply engage in non-negligent behavior. In the event of a lawsuit,
the agency will have to prove that it acted non-negligently once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. To meet this evidential bur-
den, the agency will have to document its actions, draft extra reports
listing the reasons for its ratings, and always conduct its business
with an eye toward how its actions would look to ajudge and jury.91
The rating agency will practice "defensive rating" as long as the
marginal costs of doing so are less than the marginal expected value
of the unfavorable judgments that it otherwise would incur due to
its failure to document its actions. 92 The problem is that such docu-
mentation does not produce a better product; rather, it merely
shows that the agency already has produced a non-negligent prod-
uct. The costs are "wasted" from a societal standpoint; they have
not gone into the making of a better good, but rather are spent only
to prevent the possibility of a future transfer of wealth from one
88 One can still argue that the gains from one time fraud outweigh the costs. Pro-
ponents of a negligent misrepresentation standard, however, respond that the rating
agencies, rather than the consumer, should bear the burden of fraud detection because
the rating agency is in a better position to detect the fraud.
89 See cases cited supra notes 71-72.
90 For two excellent articles arguing that the expansion of accountant liability was a
mistake, see Fischel, supra note 12, and Siliciano, supra note 18.
91 Of course, the burden of proof in a negligence action is on the plaintiff. In real-
ity, however, the rating agency is more likely to be on the defensive once the plaintiff
shows the rating was av post mistaken. Cf. Fischel, supra note 12, at 1054-55.
92 These losses would also include the intangible but still important costs to reputa-
tion exacted from rating agencies against whom suits are filed. Even a suit dismissed as
completely without merit may cause investors to lose confidence in the rating agency's
services. See Alain Sheer & Asghar Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of the
Law of Defamation, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 364, 375, 415-24 (1985).
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party to another, a fact of little economic significance apart from the
incentives it gives to each party to shape their behavior
accordingly. 93
b. The problem of cross-subsidization
Bond rating agencies collect revenue by charging bond issuers
fees that vary according to the size of the offering, 94 (and thus vary-
ing at least roughly in accordance with possible negligence liability),
and by charging subscribers fees for the information services. Be-
cause it is difficult to price discriminate between large and small in-
vestors, rating agencies charge a fixed price for each subscription.95
This is unlikely to change. Given the difficulty of preventing sub-
scribers who have paid a low price for the publication from transfer-
ring the information to heavy users who value it more, subscribers
will arbitrage away the attempt to charge differing prices.96
These fixed fees, combined with the fact that a heavy user of the
service is more likely to suffer a loss when negligent information is
published, leads to a curious result. If tort liability is imposed on
the bond rating agency, and then passed on to consumers through
higher rates to cover either outside insurance or self-insurance, then
the rating agency will pass it on to all subscribers equally. This
means that small subscribers will cross-subsidize large subscribers. 97
The small investor's cost of subscription will rise by more than the
expected value of the suits that she might bring in the future. The
large investor's costs will rise by less than the expected value of the
suits she might bring. This is because each investor pays the same
93 See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 156.
94 See supra note 86.
95 See supra note 86.
96 Arbitrage is defined as trading a good in different markets in which it commands
differing prices. See W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, supra note 29, at 297-300; W. NICHOLSON,
supra note 30, at 423-26; R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 259.
A firm can price discriminate when 1) there are two different markets, 2) there are
different elasticities of demand, and 3) the markets are effectively separated so that a
buyer cannot shift from one market to the other, or sell to a participant in another mar-
ket. Under these conditions, a monopolist sells until the marginal revenue equals the
marginal cost in each market. W. NICHOLSON, supra note 30, at 423.
The ratios of the prices in the two markets will be:
P1 (1 + 1/el) Where el and e2 represent the
-- elasticities of demand in each
P2 (1 + l/e2) market.
Id. at 425.
97 Cross-subsidization occurs when one consumer pays a portion of the costs of
another without receiving any compensation for absorbing the extra costs. This occurs
in this context because the large investor either takes a position in more securities, mak-
ing it more likely to be hurt by a negligent rating, or takes larger positions, making
damages upon injury greater.
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amount for the insurance, but the large investor is more likely to
"cash in" the policy in the courtroom. This result is analogous to
what would happen if insurance companies charged customers the
same dollar amount for insurance covering two-bedroom bungalows
as for insurance on eighteen-room mansions. The initial price
would be somewhere between the present discounted expected cost
of either house burning down.
The cost of an insurance plan is very dependent on the mix of
properties insured. It is unstable when its participants are paying
the same amount for differing amounts of insurance.98 The small
investor receives little increase in protection, despite a greater in-
crease in costs. At the same time, the large investor's actual cost of
a subscription to the rating agency's services drops, for with every
subscription comes a subsidized insurance policy. The number of
large investors subscribing will increase, while the number of small
investors subscribing will fall. To continue the housing insurance
analogy, equilibrium would be reached when none but the most
risk-averse bungalow owners still have insurance, and all but the
least risk-averse mansion owners in the market are covered.99 The
price of the insurance component of the subscription will rise to re-
flect this change in the insurance portfolio until equilibrium is
reached near the high end of the market.100 By introducing a self-
selection bias, this system results in investors at the margin being
98 Professor Nicholson states it thus:
Adverse selection occurs in situations where individuals are in a posi-
tion to assess the risks they face in a situation better than an insurance
provider can. In this case individuals who know they have small risks will
not buy insurance coverage (because it is too expensive given what they
know), whereas high-risk individuals will purchase coverage (because, for
them, it is a good buy). Hence only high-risk individuals will buy insur-
ance, thereby raising its cost.
W. NiCHOLSON, supra note 30, at 217-18; see also Gary S. Becker, Not Everyone Deserves
Affordable Auto Insurance, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1990, at 18 (noting that state insurance
plans which do not accurately reflect driver riskiness are economically inefficient).
99 A similar point is made by Peter Huber: "If an insurer cannot distinguish the
young Corvette enthusiast from the middle-aged driver of a weekend Oldsmobile, high-
risk drivers will stock up on bargain coverage while low-risk drivers will cut back, and the
insurer will eventually have to charge everyone something approaching a Corvette rate."
PETER HUBER, LiABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 12 (1988); cf.
R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 188 ("If the liability insurance market were not regulated,
insurance companies would charge different premiums to their customers according to
differences in the probability that a customer would, through his negligence, injure
someone in an accident.").
100 If investors show uniform risk aversion, and there are no information costs, then
equilibrium will be reached at the point where only one home-the most valuable-is
insured, at a price equal to the present expected value of that home catching fire. Of
course, in the real world, people are uncertain of the chance of their own home burning
down, and often do not know of competitive insurance companies' lower priced plans.
Thus, the market will stabilize before it reaches this extreme. See W. NICHOLSON, supra
note 30, at 203-08.
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frozen out of information that they value at more than its marginal
cost. Such a system is inefficient, in both a Kaldor-Hicks and a
Pareto optimality sense, as it guarantees the existence of parties who
could be made better off by a nonregulated market transfer. Fur-
thermore, the newly inaugurated negligence standard would lead to
underinvestment in the market by smaller investors. 0 1 Smaller in-
vestors, after all, are the market participants who are most likely to
be marginal investors, and less likely to have access to services com-
peting with rating agencies, such as in-house technical analysts.
0 2
This is particularly troublesome because imposing a negligence
standard should increase the level of investment based on good in-
formation, not decrease it.103
c. The distortion of the calculus of publication
In economic terms, the bond rating agency will decide whether
to publish a given rating based on the expected profit or loss of
doing so.10 4 However, the rating agency cannot fully know the
proper rating in advance. At best, it can estimate the rating with
some probability of accuracy. This probability, in turn, depends on
the amount of investigation that the agency has undertaken and the
likelihood that the information given to it by the rated company is
accurate. 105
Imposing a negligence standard will decrease the numbbr of
small bond floatings rated. An increased chance of liability for the
rating agency is an increase in the variable costs of publishing a rat-
ing. This is because, for every rating, there is a chance that courts
will find the bond rating agency liable for a negligent mistake. In
reaction to this increase in variable costs, the rating agency will cut
back on those ratings which increase its marginal variable costs the
most.'
06
The bonds that are most expensive to rate are small and new
firm issues. This is true for several reasons. First, the Securities and
Exchange Commission does not require as much public information
101 The extent to which small investors will be frozen out depends on how much the
subscription price reflects the insurance component. This, in turn, depends on how
many lawsuits will be successfully instigated against the bond rating agencies.
102 JOHN BROoKs, THE TAKEOVER GAME 136 (1987) (noting that trading is backed by
"extensive in-house research"); see infra note 125.
103 Cf id
104 See Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 92, at 415-18.
105 The decision on the appropriate amount of investigation will depend upon (i)
the cost of marginal increases in the value of probable truth, (ii) the reduction in the
marginal expected cost of liability, and (iii) the increase in the market value of the publi-
cation resulting from increased accuracy.
106 Rating agencies may, instead, charge the rated companies more, causing the
marginal players to drop out, yielding the same result.
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from small firms, which means that the agency must do more re-
search to rate these firms. 10 7 Second, small firms are more likely to
be one-time users of bond rating agencies' services. In these cases,
the bond rating agencies must always investigate the company anew,
without the benefit of previously discovered information. Third,
small firms are more likely to be volatile startup companies, which
often provide investors with greater returns, at the price of greater
risk and chance of default.108 However, a greater chance of default
means potentially more disgruntled investors looking for a deep
pocket to recover from. Thus, rating small and new firms is more
costly than rating established firms.
Just as accountants now have an incentive to limit their services
to those clients who have few third party contacts, and to withdraw
services altogether from clients in high-risk industries, 10 9 so will rat-
ing agencies tend to withdraw from those companies which pose the
greatest threat of liability. Unfortunately, this increased liability,
which was intended to increase the level of investment based on ac-
curate information, will instead restrict the ratings to those arenas
where it is less relevant. To paraphrase Professor Siliciano, those
"[f]irms that would benefit most from an independent [rating]-be-
cause they are young or small or unstructured-may be denied such
services on the ground that they pose excessive [rating] risks."'
110
The companies most likely to receive audits will be precisely those
firms which are least likely to need them, as the additional informa-
tion that the rating of a well-established firm's securities carries to
the market is less than that which a rating of a new, unknown firm's
securities accomplishes. The push for higher information quality will
force a lower quantity of information. It is unclear whether this will
lead to more or less investment based on quality information."'
In light of these increased expenses, imposing a negligence sys-
tem will result in an agency bias against small and new companies.
In addition, it will result in a bias against new financial instruments,
107 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982) (ex-
empting small issuers from filing certain statements); Securities Act Release No. 33-
5450, 39 Fed. Reg. 2353 (1974) (exempting securities offered and sold within one state
from certain registration requirements); 17 C.F.R. 230.251 to 230.264 (1989) (relaxing
certain registration requirements). Congress also authorized relaxation of securities
standards for small business in the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988)).
108 See W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, supra note 29, at 282-86.
109 See Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1967 (noting that the "promised response of the
accounting profession to third-party liability exposure will be to limit their auditing
function to 'safe' companies, rather than to audit all companies more thoroughly.")
(footnote omitted).
110 Id.
111 Cf id. at 1967-68 (developing similar analysis for accounting firms).
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which offer many of the same hazards as rating a startup company.
This bias will impair the ability of small and new firms to raise capi-
tal needed for expansion and growth. Imposing a negligence stan-
dard therefore disadvantages the smaller market players on both the
investor and investment side.
Finally, imposing a negligence standard will result in a nonsys-
tematic bias in ratings in favor of investors and against rated compa-
nies. This bias flows from the asymmetric incentives of the two
sides to sue a bond rating agency for a false rating. If the rating is
negligently made too high, the relying investors will have full incen-
tive to sue. Because they potentially can recover full compensatory
damages, and because they can still use the bond rating agencies
even after the filing of the lawsuit, investors will not hesitate to sue
when ratings are erroneously too high. The rated company, on the
other hand, often will be unable to sue for a negligent rating that is
unfavorable to them. If they sue, they may endanger all future bond
floatings which also will need ratings. Therefore, it will be in the
rating agencies' interest to err in favor of the investor, at least in
cases on the margin where the rating is more likely to lead to a po-
tential lawsuit. 112 Thus, the primary function of the bond rating
agencies, accurately rating securities, will be endangered by impos-
ing a negligence standard.
d. The problem with deterrent effects
"When all is said and done, the modern [negligence] rules do
not deter risk: they deter behavior that gets people sued, which is
not at all the same thing."' " 3 A negligence system's deterrent effect
is the difference between the probability of the actor incurring liabil-
ity when she is not negligent and the probability when she is.1
14
Courts should impose liability only if it will cause actors that are
underinvesting in accuracy to increase their investment. 1 15 A forced
112 Of course, if the bias were systematic, then investors would merely discount all
ratings by a certain percent to come up with the correct rating. In fact, the bias will be
concentrated in those issues which pose the greatest threat of future lawsuits. Because
investors cannot determine which of these issues the rating agencies consider most vul-
nerable (for if the agency were to let investors know, then differing ratings would be-
come meaningless), their only solution will be to discount all rating agencies' risk
analysis. When this occurs, the bad ratings taint the good ratings, and investors are
worse off.
113 P. HUBER, supra note 99, at 164.
114 "The deterrent force of any rule is the difference between how the rule treats those
who obey and how it treats those who disobey." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at
678 (emphasis in original); see R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 513-14; Fischel, supra note 12,
at 1055.
115 Furthermore, it only makes sense if the increase in value to consumers of the
bond rating agencies' services exceeds the administrative costs of the system. See R.
POSNER, supra note 28, at 187.
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increase in investment in other circumstances is wasted-the value
of the increased accuracy is worth less than its cost. A dollar wasted
in increasing accuracy beyond the optimal level, after all, is just as
wasteful as a needed dollar unspent by a negligent firm.
Imposing a higher standard of care on rating agencies is proper
only if: a) the market system will not force rating agencies to make
investments in accuracy by itself,"t6 and b) the judicial system can
pinpoint most instances of negligent behavior without falsely impli-
cating non-negligent behavior. 1 7 If the rating agency's actions
have little to do with whether it will be found guilty of negligence,
then there is little reason for it to increase its investment in
accuracy.
Even granting these two assumptions, courts should not impose
a greater standard of care unless the value of the increases in accu-
racy are greater than the monitoring costs of administering the sys-
tem.118 If the increases in accuracy are worth less than the
combination of attorney fees, opportunity costs of court time, and
the increased documentation costs that the bond rating agency will
have to bear, then the lawmakers or courts should not impose a
greater standard of care.119
1. Bond Rating Agencies Rate Bond Issues Accurately
In Part II(A), this Note established the theoretical reasons why
a bond rating agency will not engage in negligent behavior, even
absent any judicial controls over its actions.120 The marketplace is
too pervasive a task master, and monitoring costs are too low to
permit a negligent rating agency to survive for long. This subsec-
tion expands that discussion by moving outside the theoretical
framework to evaluate the actual performance of bond rating agen-
cies. After all, if the goal of expanding liability is to force an optimal
116 If the bond rating agency already is exercising the proper degree of care, forcing
it to exercise greater care creates a loss from overinvestment in accuracy. The increased
level of accuracy is worth less than the cost of the resources used to increase accuracy,
which could have been used more productively elsewhere. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 23, at 678. Increasing investments in accuracy in this situation actually makes
society worse off.
117 Id; see also R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 513-14 (as the risk that legitimate conduct
will be found to violate a rule increases, the deterrent effect of that rule decreases).
118 See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 517.
119 Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel note:
For any offense, there is an optimal level of enforcement at which the
costs of expending an additional enforcement dollar equal the gains from
reducing the incidence of the offense. The optimal level of enforcement
allows some violations to occur because the costs of stamping out these
violations exceed the costs of the violations themselves.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 678.
120 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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level of accuracy, then the initial question should be whether the
current standard is working.
Considerable evidence supports the proposition that bond rat-
ing agencies exercise a level of care that is, in fact, quite close to the
optimum level of care. First, as explained above, bond rating agen-
cies possess a significant continuity. The five major firms have ex-
isted for decades, and have rated bonds for a long period of time.121
With such continuity, the market can use past performance as a
proxy for present and future performance. By examining how often
the rating agencies have been wrong in the past, investors can ap-
propriately discount the value of the services to reflect the likeli-
hood of current mistakes.
Several studies have correlated the relationship between bond
ratings and failures. One study collected the rating data for all firms
that defaulted between January 1970 and December 1984. It found
that:
[O]f the 88 defaulting firms for which ratings were available
one year prior to default, only one (Manville, which was rated A)
was rated above triple B by Standard & Poor's. Only 16 were
rated higher than B. Altman and Nammacher estimate that be-
tween 1974 and 1984 the average default rate on nonconvertible
debt rated double B or lower was 1.60% a year versus .08%o a year
for all nonconvertible debt. Based on these results, it appears that
ratings do indeed reflect relative default risks. 122
This data is important for two reasons. First, it illustrates that inves-
tors can track the accuracy of rating agencies with relative ease, and
second, that the ratings generally reflect the relative risk of de-
fault. 123 Though the market is one of differentiated oligopoly, the
major players are very competitive in preserving their considerable
investments in their rating infrastructures. 124 In addition, there are
121 Of the five largest bond rating agencies, four began rating securities early in the
twentieth century. One, McCarthy, Crisanti & Maggee, was formed in 1975. Ederington
& Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 4-5.
122 Ederington & Yawitz, supra note 5, ch. 23, at 17 (which also catalogues other
studies on bond rating accuracy reaching the same conclusion); see also STANDARD &
POOR'S, CREDrrWEEK, Feb. 20, 1985 (detailing the results of a study showing that bond
rating agencies are very good predictors of risk).
Researchers also have attempted to duplicate bond rating results with econometric
models. The best results have reached a high of over 70%o agreement. Whether the
failure to get better agreement is because of deficiencies of the models or agencies is
unknown. See Ang & Patel, supra note 1, at 631-40; Hettenhouse & Sartoris, supra note 1,
at 66-76; Pinches & Singleton, supra note 1, at 2943.
123 They at least show the expected correlation between risk and subsequent default.
Market forces must adjust the rating structure into the appropriate discount for riskier
ventures, and thereby have prices that reflect expected default rates.
124 See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 30, at 448-65. An oligopolistic bond rating agency
engaging in monopolistic competition (with similar but differentiated products and sev-
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several mid-size competitors and many niche players well positioned
to expand should the major agencies falter. These fringe players all
work together to ensure that the major rating agencies keep their
investment in accuracy near the optimal level. 125 The data, in turn,
shows that this competitive pressure has resulted in a high level of
rating agency accuracy.
The evidence that the major bond rating agencies usually "get
the rating right" suggests that imposing a negligence standard will
not increase the level of accuracy in ratings. The market forces de-
scribed above encourage the rating agencies to pursue the maxi-
mum accuracy that they reasonably can obtain. Additional liability
will only increase their costs, which they will partially absorb and
partially pass on to the ultimate consumers, the subscribers to their
periodicals. Thus, a negligence system would hurt the very people
it is designed to help.
2. Bond Rating Agency Negligence Would Be Very Difficult to Deter-
mine Within the Courtroom
The tort system, by its very nature, is a backward-looking sys-
tem which attempts to recreate within the courtroom the optimum
level of care an actor should have exercised with full benefit of hind-
sight. Viewed from the vantage point of a subscriber (and jury) who
knows a company has defaulted, key documents that might have in-
dicated potential trouble are easily emphasized, even if it was quite
reasonable to give them less weight at the time of rating.
Accountants have responded to their increased liability not by
increasing their level of accuracy, but rather by seeking to contract
around their new-found liability. 126 Because the determination of
negligence "is often dangerously open-ended and subjective,"' 127
some commentators have noted that "courts and juries frequently
hold accountants to unrealistic and unattainable standards that ef-
fectively force them to act as insurers of the businesses they au-
dit."'128 In light of the above facts,
eral players) will react similarly to a monopolist, but subject to the constraint that it will
not raise prices high enough to make customer raiding profitable to a rival firm. In such
markets, competition tends to focus on quality and advertising rather than price, once
the participants have reached a stable price solution. Id. at 462-63; see also id. at 455-61
(various models of firm pricing behavior under imperfectly competitive conditions).
125 For example, Fitch currently is attempting to expand into the traditional markets
of Standard & Poor's & Moody's. Zigas, supra note 4, at 108. In addition, six of the
largest U.S. securities firms currently are forming an Electronic Joint Venture which
would distribute bond prices and data world wide. Tom Herman & William Power, Wall
Street Group Plans to Provide Bond-Data Service, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1990, at C1, col. 6.
126 Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1959-60.
127 Id. at 1962 (footnote omitted).
128 Id.; see Minow, Accountant's Liability and the Litigation Explosion,J. AccT., Sept. 1984,
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the evasive behavior of acountants is hardly surprising. Faced
with the prospect of a reckless client, a limited technology, and an
error-prone adjudicative process, the profession might reasonably
view the enhanced liability imposed by the reform courts simply as
a tax on the activity of accounting. Worse yet, it is a tax that to a
significant extent appears to operate independently of the ac-
countant's level of care.
129
The same problems are likely to arise again if similar legal liability is
placed on rating agencies.
This problem is not unique to rating agencies or to account-
ants. Juries regularly evaluate such difficult cases as those involving
antitrust violations and complicated contract disputes. Yet a rating
agency violation differs from, say, an attempted monopolization
case, in that in the antitrust case, society must rely on the courtroom
because no market alternative exists. The market may give a com-
petitor an incentive to monopolize or to breach her contract-
results that society deems undesirable-but in the case of a rating
agency, the market and the jury push in the same direction. Society
tolerates the false positives of jury inaccuracy in antitrust cases be-
cause it needs a counterweight to the market. But where the market
actually encourages the optimal societal result, and where the mar-
ket is likely to do so in a fashion that is much more cost-effective
than the courtroom, then lawmakers should be particularly wary of
imposing liability.
Securities rating is so specialized that juries unfamiliar with the
field will have great difficulty distinguishing significant factors from
insignificant ones. Because of this, even if the bond rating firm reg-
ularly acts negligently, the deterrent effect of a system of liability
rules will be minimal. The difficulty of identifying negligent behav-
ior in all but the most obvious cases will lead to identification of
proper behavior as blameworthy, and the exoneration of negligent
behavior. Because the actual level of negligence will have little cor-
respondence with the likelihood of being found liable for negli-
gence, there will be little incentive to improve accuracy,'
30
especially considering that bond rating agencies already are consist-
ently very accurate.' 3 ' Thus, implementing a negligence standard
will only encourage suits brought for harassment or mistaken rea-
at 77 (noting "the failure of courts and juries to distinguish between an audit failure and
a business failure").
129 Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1962-63.
13O In a world where it is difficult to distinguish the guilty from the innocent, "even
truth-tellers will say as little as possible in order to avoid paying the penalty for lying."
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 678.
131 See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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sons, without increasing the welfare of investors or encouraging a
higher level of care on the part of defendants.
C. Economic Analysis Favors Retaining a Recklessness
Standard
Advocates of a greater standard of care often trot out the ratio-
nales of deterrence and risk-spreading to convince courts that cen-
tralizing risk on the seller will result in a more economically fair
result. The economic arguments are not one-sided, however. A sys-
tem of tort negligence is not costless, especially given that the bulk
of any compensatory recoveries would be consumed through the
transaction costs required to allocate blame, namely the opportunity
costs of the courts' and parties' time, and both sides' legal fees. 132 A
negligence standard requires the rating agencies to provide an in-
surance policy against negligence with every bond rating periodical
subscription. Such coverage is costly, especially when one considers
that these policies sometimes will be "cashed in" even when the rat-
ing agency has not been negligent, and that the rating agencies'
practice of providing subscriptions for a fixed price will lead to a
self-selection bias which will selectively drive out the smaller
investor.
These costs are worthwhile only if the deterrent effect is so
great that the value of the increased accuracy plus the value of the
insurance provided is greater than the costs of the tort system, in-
cluding litigation fees, mistaken verdicts, and the costs of "defensive
rating." Yet, as supported by both theory and empirical evidence,
the market system gives firms the utmost reason to pursue accuracy.
Rating agencies competing both among themselves and against
close market substitutes must value accuracy highly. Studies show-
ing that bond rating agencies have maintained a high degree of ac-
curacy in the past demonstrate this.' 33 In these circumstances, a
system of negligence liability provides minimal deterrent effects.
Courts, therefore, should be wary of imposing negligence liability
on bond rating agencies. 134 Doing so in the belief that a negligence
132 Richard Willard notes that a Rand Study found that over half the money involved
in lawsuits covers lawyers and other legal costs. See Richard K. Willard, Changing the Law:
The Role of Lawyers, Judges and Legislators Concerning Social Engineering and the Common Law,
11 HAiv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 23 (1988).
133 See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
134 Professor Levmore asserts that "[e]conomists are quick to assume, in the ab-
sence of collusion or other market imperfections, that prevailing economic arrange-
ments are sensible and, at times, ingenious." Levmore, supra note 24, at 666. Yet this is
not the criticism he intends, but instead a rational presumption. Economic systems
adapt to fit the legal structures in place. Flexible prices and bargaining among economic
actors renders the system relatively efficient by rerouting resources to those best able to
use them. This Note attempts to show that the current system rests on a solid economic
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standard will be economically efficient, as the courts appear to be
doing in accountant liability cases, may hurt the very consumer that
the court is attempting to help.13 5
D. A Postscript on Privity
Although this Note deals mostly with the proper level of care
which should govern bond rating agency liability, it is worth at least
a passing mention that reform-oriented courts often extend liability
in two ways simultaneously. In addition to allowing recovery using a
looser standard of care, they often also allow more parties to re-
cover by loosening the privity standards. Although the two issues
theoretically are quite independent, one cannot evaluate them com-
pletely separately, for the rating agency is concerned not only with
the ease with which an investor can recover, but also the amount
of recovery. This Note so far has treated the two issues
simultaneously.
One issue, however, deserves separate mention. As already
noted, securities research has many attributes of a public good in
that it confers a benefit not only on a bond rating agency's client,
but also on other potential investors. 3 6 Even parties who decide
not to invest in the market, based on this information, benefit from
its existence. This is one social benefit which rating agencies bring
to the capital markets.
When privity is expanded, however, these free-riding third par-
ties become potential liabilities. Loosening the privity rules means
that certain individuals always will be able to benefit from securities
information on the upside, while being insured on the downside.
Furthermore, the rating agency will not be compensated for this ad-
ditional liability. This is a variable cost which it only partially can
pass on to its subscribers. The agency, in response, will be forced to
decrease the amount of ratings it undertakes because it suddenly has
become liable to parties who have not contracted with it. The
courts, believing they have solved the problem of a set of "foresee-
able" plaintiffs who reasonably have relied on negligent informa-
foundation. The arguments intend more than mere support of the status quo; hope-
fully, they demonstrate that the current system of freely-made decisions voluntarily es-
tablishing the burden of care is the best system. Tampering with it in the belief that
doing so would increase efficiency, as has been done with attorney and accountant liabil-
ity, is ill-advised.
1-35 If courts adopt the negligence standard, it is unlikely that legislatures will over-
turn the result. Even if investors would be made better off in the aggregate by reversal,
because the costs are distributed among many potential beneficiaries, no one will have
an incentive to lobby for change. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 672.
136 See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (discussion of third-party effects
and free-riders), and supra notes 23-24 & 42 and accompanying text (discussion of the
public good aspect of securities research).
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tion, instead have deliberately created a classic externality which
allows third parties not only to receive valuable information free (as
they formerly did), but now adds the further indignity of requiring
the agency to insure the quality of this free information.13 7 Thus,
the expansion of privity is as troublesome as an expansion of the
duty of care, from an economic perspective.
III
FIRST AMENDMENT ASPECTS
A. First Amendment Protections of Commercial Information
"[Standard & Poor's] simply has a right, as part of the media,
to express its opinions in the form of letter symbols."'
38
Although this Note focuses on the economic consequences of
different legal regimes in the rating agency arena, this topic would
not be complete without a discussion of the role that the first
amendment plays for the bond rating agencies. As the introductory
quote to this section illustrates, the most significant distinction be-
tween agencies and the now-liable accountants is that the rating
agencies can cling to the first amendment. Traditional first amend-
ment analysis fully supports the economic arguments against a neg-
ligence standard which this Note already has developed. This
conclusion, however, is not obvious, nor fully addressed by the
Supreme Court. A bond rating-the heart of the information which
rating agencies publish-is at most three letters long. While they
communicate a lot of information, and represent much work, it is
not immediately obvious that bond ratings were what the framers
had in mind when they proposed the first amendment. If they are
protected at all, then bond ratings are the world's shortest
editorials.
The Supreme Court has noted that "[s]ome tension necessarily
exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and
the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury."' 139 However,
society's substantial interest in ensuring the free flow of ideas has
led courts to value the benefits of information availability more
highly than the protection of private persons who have been
137 Cf Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1965-67.
138 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRrERIA, supra note 1, at 3.
As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he press in its historic connotation compre-
hends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."
Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); see also Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) ("[courts should be chary of deciding
what is and what is not news.") (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 723 F.2d 195, 215 (1983) (MeskillJ., dissenting)).
139 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
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harmed. 140 As this Note concludes, similar reasoning should pro-
tect rating agencies.
Most cases involving publication of allegedly false material are
libel and defamation cases. 141 However, as the Supreme Court re-
cently has noted, "in cases raising First Amendment issues .. .an
appellate court has an obligation to 'make an independent examina-
tion of the whole record' in order to make sure 'that the judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion.' "142 Thus, any case alleging negligent misrepresentation
against a bond rating agency implicates first amendment issues. 143
First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Standard & Poor's Corp. is the most
recent case in which an investor accused a bond rating agency of
negligent misrepresentation. 144 The item of contention in this case
was volume 46, no. 11 of Standard & Poor's Corporation Records.145
In that issue, Standard & Poor's provided a rating for convertible
secured trust notes issued by Pan American World Airways, Inc.
The description of the bonds was inaccurate. Standard & Poor's
listed the convertible bonds as including accumulated interest upon
conversion. In reality, when the notes were converted into common
stock in August 1985, only the principal, and not the interest, was
counted in calculating the conversion rate.146 Two plaintiffs, clients
of First Equity, alleged that they had invested in the corporation's
notes in reliance on the description in Corporation Records. The dis-
140 E.g., Pittman v. DowJones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La.), aft'd, 834
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 216-19 for cases in which courts have decided
that the first amendment allows a negligent party to trump the claim of a relying party.
141 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967);
JOHN NOWAK, RONALD ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 926-39 (3d
ed. 1986) (summarizing recent trends in the libel area).
142 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)).
143 The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONsT. amend. I. This
applies to states through the fourteenth amendment.
In New York Times, the Court identified several functions of the first amendment,
including "freedom of expression upon public questions," assuring the "unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people," and "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people." New York Times, 376
U.S. at 269.
144 First Equity II, 869 F.2d 175; First Equity II, 690 F. Supp. 256; First Equity 1, 670 F.
Supp. 115. See supra note 16 for other cases involving allegedly negligent publishers of
financial information and the first amendment.
145 Standard & Poor's Corporation Records "contains factual descriptions of the princi-
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trict court, ruling on a motion for summary judgment, rejected the
plaintiffs' claims for negligent misrepresentation 47 and fraud,1 4
8
and decided that the Restatement's negligent misrepresentation
standard did not apply to a newspaper publisher such as Standard &
Poor's. 149
The court applied the widely cited Jaillet rule.1 50 Under that
rule, a newspaper publisher is not liable "to a member of the public
for a non-defamatory negligent misstatement of an item of news,
'unless he wilfully ... circulates it knowing it to be false, and it is
calculated to and does ... result in injury to another person.' ",51
This rule is efficient and practical, as it is nearly impossible for a
newspaper to attain perfection. Furthermore, the rule shields pub-
lishers from "the spectre of unlimited liability,"' 52 which would
have a staggering deterrent effect on publishers.1 53 The court
noted that the first amendment requires a showing of falsity or at
least recklessness before a court may constitutionally impose liabil-
ity on a newspaper for publishing a non-defamatory misstatement.
147 Id. at 118-19.
148 First Equity II, 690 F. Supp. at 260.
149 See supra note 69 for the text of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
150 First Equity I, 670 F. Supp. at 117. The widely citedJaillet rule comes from an
early New York trial court case. InJaillet, the court found that DowJones & Co. was not
liable for negligently supplying its subscribers with incorrect information. Dow Jones
incorrectly reported over its ticker tape service the result of a United States Supreme
Court case on the taxable status of stock dividends as income. The plaintiff sold his
stocks, instead of buying more, based on this report. The court found that no contract
or fiduciary relationship existed between the parties, and that the "the relation of the
defendant association to the public is the same as that of a publisher of a newspaper, and
that its duties and obligations are to be measured by the same standard." Jaillet v. Cash-
man, 115 Misc. 383, 384, 189 N.Y.S. 743, 744 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd mem., 202 A.D. 805,
194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div. 1922), aff'd mem., 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923).
151 First Equity 1, 670 F. Supp. at 117 (citation omitted).
152 Id. As the comment to the Restatement notes:
When the harm that is caused is only pecuniary loss, the courts have
found it necessary to adopt a more restricted rule of liability, because of
the extent to which misinformation may be, and may expect to be, circu-
lated, and the magnitude of the losses which may follow from reliance
upon it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
As an example of "unlimited liability," the value of the securities listed in the issue
of Corporation Records litigated in First Equity I was over $65 billion. First Equity 1, 670 F.
Supp. at 117 n.3. If the court had accepted the plaintiff's contention that section 552
allowed recovery, then the plaintiff's recovery would be governed by section 552B.
Under that section, compensatory damages would be:
(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in the
transaction and its purchase price or other value given for it; and
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the plain-
tiff's reliance upon the misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B (1977).
153 See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text for an economic analysis of the
deterrent effects of a system of negligence.
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The court stated that to find reckless disregard, "[tihere must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."'15
4
Because the plaintiff had not shown any evidence of such doubts,
the case was dismissed.
155
The court of appeals affirmed, after noting that Standard &
Poor's occupied a space somewhere between that of a publisher of a
general-interest newspaper and an advisory newsletter making spe-
cific investment recommendations. 56 Although the court affirmed
on grounds other than the first amendment, it briefly summarized
the reasons for applying the first amendment to investment publica-
tions. The court noted that the readership of a publication such as
Corporation Records is very large, and that this implicates many possi-
ble plaintiffs. Further, it stated that "[t]he potential for meritless or
even fraudulent claims [was] high, and the cost of even successful
defenses [potentially] prohibitive."' 157 Finally, the court observed
that the contents of Corporation Records were not a viable substitute
for the actual prospectus issued by a company under federal law.
The court concluded:
In such circumstances, we believe that a user is in the best
position to weigh the danger of inaccuracy and potential loss aris-
ing from a particular use of a summary against the cost of verify-
ing the summary by examination of the original documents or
prospectus. That being the case, the user should bear the risk...
of proof of a knowing misstatement. 5 8
Both First Equity courts were on firm ground in their decisions.
The Supreme Court has stated that society should not depend on
courts for correction of false information, but on the marketplace of
ideas. 159 The Court, in a series of cases starting with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,'60 has fashioned strong protections for publishers
who have published false information. In New York Times, the Court
154 First Equity II, 690 F. Supp. at 259 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968)). St. Amant also noted that "reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
before publishing." St. Amant, 340 U.S. at 731; accord Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74 (1968) (requirement of "high degree of awareness of their probable falsity").
155 First Equity II, 690 F. Supp. at 259-60.
156 First Equity III, 869 F.2d at 176.
157 Id. at 180.
158 Id.
159 "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (footnote omitted).
160 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 141, at
926-39.
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held that the first amendment prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for utterances connected with her official conduct
unless she proves "that the statement was made.., with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."' 16 In a later case, the Court defined "reckless disregard" as
meaning that the defendant had "in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publications."' 162
In the related context of libel suits, 163 the Supreme Court has
formulated a two-part analysis in which the degree of care that a
publisher owes a plaintiff depends on the plaintiff's societal position
(public or private figure), 16 4 and whether the matter is one of "pub-
lic concern."' 165 The first test is irrelevant to the question of bond
rating agency liability; however, the issue of whether a bond rating
raises an issue of public concern is critical. Although the Court
never has laid out a systematic checklist of the particular facts that
distinguish an issue of public concern from a purely private mat-
ter, 166 an analysis of recent cases reveals the following factors as
most significant:
* whether the market provides a powerful incentive for
accuracy; 1
67
* whether the speech was of interest to more than solely the
speaker and the specific business audience; 168
* whether the speech involves a "strong interest in the free flow
161 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
162 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
163 Libel and defamation suits comprise most of the suits in this area of the law. See
supra note 141 for a list of major Supreme Court cases in this area.
164 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).-
165 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-63
(1985). "It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection.' " Id. at 758-59 (citations omitted); see also Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, 475 U.S. 767 (where the defamatory statements are of public concern, a plaintiff
who is a private figure bears the burden of proving that such statements are false).
166 "Those who thought that the constitutional law of libel could not be made more
complex must be few in number after the fragmented Supreme Court decision in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note
141, at 937.
167 Dun &Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762-63. Actually, this factor cuts both ways. On the
one hand, if the market compels accuracy by agencies, then there is little need to allow
potentially chilling negligence suits. On the other, if the market compels accuracy, then
the incremental chilling effect of imposing a negligence system is minimal. This tension
is reflected in a comparison of the Court's language in footnote 8 of the Dun &Bradstreet
opinion and its language on pages 762-63.
The role of the market in forcing bond rating accuracy is described supra notes 62-
65, 121-25 and accompanying text.
168 Id. at 762. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (discussion of third
party effects and free-riders) and supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussion of
the public good aspect of securities research).
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of commercial information";169
" whether the speech contains any true elements;
170
* whether the speech requires special protection to keep debate
uninhibited and wide-open;
17'
* whether the speech is likely to be deterred by incidental state
regulation;1
72
* whether the speech involves matters "at the core" of the first
amendment protections (i.e., political speech);'
73
* whether the speech involves a matter that is in the news.
174
The more affirmative responses a court provides to these questions,
the more likely it will find the speech to be of public concern and
thus protected by the first amendment from burdensome state
regulation.17
5
Applying this analysis, a strong case can be made for not hold-
ing bond rating agencies liable for a negligent printing. These fac-
tors indicate that the Court is quite willing to consider the role of
commercial markets and how they interact with the first amendment
marketplace of ideas. Given the Court's preference for allowing the
impartial market, rather than the government, to regulate speech,
the economic analysis developed above is still quite relevant, even
when the debate shifts to the seemingly economically neutral consti-
tutional arena.
The first amendment provides an additional reason for not
holding rating agencies liable for negligent conduct. As already ex-
amined in detail above, the markets and competition provide a
strong incentive to keep rating agencies from engaging in negligent
169 Id. See supra notes 23-60 and accompanying text (society's interest in the free
flow of commercial information).
170 Id.
171 Id.; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
172 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762-63. The ambiguity of this factor is explored
infra note 202.
173 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
174 Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New Directions, in First
Amendment Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REv. 767, 786 (1988).
175 Dun &Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759. Although the first amendment only applies on
its terms to governmental bodies, a similar result obtains when a suit is brought by a
private party. This is because "the need to encourage debate on public issues.., is of
concern in a similar manner in [a] case involving a private suit for damages." Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
The dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers feared that the majority's decision protected
negligent publishers: "[T]he only litigants-and the only publishers-who will benefit
from today's decision are those who act negligently or maliciously." Id. at 780. Nothing
in the majority's opinion dispels this view, which strengthens the case for a negligent
publisher.
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behavior. 176 A rating is of interest to people throughout the invest-
ment community and beyond, and it is difficult to imagine a type of
speech that presents a stronger interest in the free flow of informa-
tion. Accurate information concerning investments, especially in-
formation about the risk of bond defaults, is critical to the proper
functioning of the securities markets. Bond investment data is com-
mercial information at its purest.
The Supreme Court applied many of the factors listed above in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 177 In that case, a con-
struction contractor brought a defamation action against Dun &
Bradstreet for issuing a credit report which mistakenly listed the
plaintiff as having filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. 178 The
Supreme Court, in holding that the plaintiff could recover libel
damages, examined each factor, and answered them all negatively.
The Court found that there was little public interest in the speech,
as only five people received the credit report. 179 The Court also
stated that speech of such limited circulation was of interest only to
the targeted business audience, and not the general public. Finally,
the Court found that, because the speech was for a profit motive-
speech which is less likely to be deterred by imposing liability for
libel-there was less need to fear the chilling effect on publication
warned of in New York Times.' 80
While a potential plaintiff could use the last factor to argue that
the commercial, profit-motivated speech of a bond rating agency
thus deserves less protection, the Court, in a footnote to Dun &
Bradstreet, explicitly rejected the notion that courts should give all
economic or commercial speech reduced constitutional protec-
176 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
177 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
178 Id. at 751.
179 Id. at 762. While a publication such as Corporation Records is published "purely for
profit," and communicates information about the economic health of its subject, a credit
report actually has more in common with an audit than it does with a security rating.
Like the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet, an audit is intended for a limited audience.
Similarly, both involve specific matters of interest to only a few people.
Security ratings, on the other hand, are intended for widespread dissemination to
the general financial community. This implicates a "strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information." Id. at 750 (quoting Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)). There are fewer foreseeable
relying parties in the context of an audit than in the context of bond ratings. Indeed, the
number of foreseeable relying parties may well be the entire financial community, in-
cluding investors who did not pay for a subscription. Because of this, the chilling effect
that a negligence standard has on accountants is drastically less than the effect would be
on bond rating agencies.
180 Id. at 762-63. As the New York Times Court noted, courts should avoid imposing
liability where publishers fear to publish "even though [a statement] is in fact true, be-
cause of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so." New York Times. 376 U.S. at 279.
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tion.181 When all the other factors indicated by the Court are an-
swered positively, the declining distinctions between commercial
and noncommercial speech do not dictate a conclusion that a bond
rating agency's risk reports are not items of public concern.18 2 Un-
like the plaintiff in Dun & Bradstreet, who recovered only because of
the narrow circulation of the credit report in that case, the general
community benefits from the wide circulation of credit ratings.
For speech on issues of public concern, negligence "is constitu-
tionally insufficient" to sustain liability.' 8 3 If the rule were other-
wise, it would be difficult to ensure that debate on public issues
remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 1 4 Under this stan-
dard, if bond rating is a matter of public concern, courts could not
hold a bond rating agency liable unless there is evidence that the
agency "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [its]
publication,"'' 8 5 or that it knew that there was a "high degree of
awareness of the[ ] probable falsity"' 18 6 of its publication. As in the
libel context, "reckless conduct is not measured by whether a rea-
sonably prudent man would have published, or would have investi-
gated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication."'
' 8 7
B. Applying the First Amendment to Bond Rating Agencies
"Accuracy in news reporting is certainly a desideratum, but
the chilling effect of imposing a high duty of care on those in the
business of news dissemination and making that duty run to a
wide range of readers or TV viewers would have a chilling effect
181 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 n.8. This interpretation mirrors the language of
Lovell v. City of Griffins Ga., 303 U.S. 949 (1938), which stated that all publications
which communicate "information and opinion" are covered under the first amendment.
182 See Virginia Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (statute prohibiting the advertisement of
prescription drugs held invalid because society has strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information).
One could argue that Standard & Poor's speech is not commercial speech as the
Supreme Court has defined it. The Court has stated that commercial speech is speech
that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). This definition is "the
core notion of commercial speech." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
66 (1983). A bond rating agency's speech, however, does not propose a commercial
transaction. Rather, it disseminates information so that others may enter into commer-
cial transactions on their own. Because they report items of general interest, and do not
engage in commercial speech, bond rating agencies merit full first amendment
protection.
183 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288.
184 Idt at 270.
185 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
186 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1968).
187 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
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which is unacceptable under our Constitution."1 88
The crucial issue is, therefore, whether bond ratings and invest-
ment information are matters of "public concern." Several courts
have found that published financial information is of public concern,
basing their findings on the value of the free flow of public informa-
tion on investments. 189 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[w]hether ... speech addresses a matter of public con-
cern must be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and
context ... as revealed by the whole record."' 90 The Court used
this process when it determined that the credit report in Dun &
Bradstreet was a private matter. 19 1 When the "speech" is a general
circulation tabloid, however, a general view has emerged that "[no]
action for damages lies against a newspaper for merely inaccurate
reporting when the publication does not constitute libel."' 9 2 As the
court in First Equity stated:
It is widely recognized that in the absence of a contract, fidu-
ciary relationship, or intent to cause injury, a newspaper publisher
is not liable to a member of the public for a non-defamatory negli-
gent misstatement of an item of news, "unless he wilfully... cir-
culates it knowing it to be false, and it is calculated to and does,
... result in injury to another person."
19 3
Ratings are editorial opinions, published in letter form. The
purpose of any editorial, whether or not it is in the financial arena, is
to communicate information to the reader. The form of the speech
is irrelevant, as the Court has recognized by granting first amend-
ment protections to certain symbolic acts, such as flag-burning. The
first amendment is only concerned with whether ideas are being
communicated from one person to another, and not the form of the
communication.
It is apparent, therefore, that bond ratings are indeed the
world's shortest editorials. As editorials, courts should grant them
the same deference they grant any other protected first amendment
publication. Ratings merely provide a simple means for consumers
to compare rough levels of risk among varying companies and
188 Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (D.NJ.
1978).
189 See cases cited supra note 16.
190 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
191 Id. at 762.
192 Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Mo. 1963).o
193 First Equity !, 670 F. Supp. at 117 (quoting 58 AM.JuR. 2D Newspapers, Periodicals &
Press § 22 (1971)); see also Lang-worthy, 368 S.W.2d 385 (no action for damages for merely
inaccurate reporting).
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industries. 194
C. A Comparison of the First Amendment and Economic
Analysis
"Moreover, because we have squarely held that the expres-
sion of opinion about a commercial product such as a loudspeaker
is protected by the First Amendment, it is difficult to see why the
expression of an opinion about a marketable security should not
also be protected."'195
Because there is no fiduciary relationship and no contractual
relationship for imposing a higher standard of care, courts cannot
impose a negligent misrepresentation standard on bond rating
agencies without risking a potentially chilling effect on the publica-
tion of credit report ratings. 196 Thus, this Note's economic analysis
leads to the same conclusions as its first amendment analysis. This
result is not unexpected. The first amendment, after all, anticipates
and encourages that truth should have a free reign in the market-
place of ideas, and this has the economic meaning implied by the
phrase.19 7 Information is valuable, and benefits more than just the
parties who contract for its production.198 The first amendment was
adopted in part to reduce information costs that would stand in the
way of private orderings of affairs;' 9 9 imposing a negligence stan-
dard would contravene this goal.
Society has an interest in encouraging publication so long as
the benefits of publication outweigh the costs. 20 0 In the bond rating
context, if a plaintiff were allowed to recover on a showing of mere
194 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRrrERIA, supra note 1, at 3.
195 Lowe v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 210 n.58 (1985).
196 See supra notes 138-94.
197 "Ideas are a useful good produced in enormous quantity in a highly competitive
market. The marketplace of ideas of which Holmes wrote is a fact, not merely a figure of
speech." R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 627; see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198 The public good aspect of securities research is discussed supra notes 23-24 & 42
and accompanying text.
199 As one commentator has noted,
[t]he application of such algebraic thinking to speech issues is not
unfamiliar in our jurisprudence: Judge Hand himself applied a variation
of his Carroll Towing formula when he interpreted the "clear and present
danger" test as an issue of "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justified such an invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger." The Supreme Court accepted Hand's formula-
tion, legitimizing the use of cost/benefit theory in first amendment
analysis.
Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Reuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
200 The publisher has an incentive to publish in the same circumstances and to maxi-
mize the value of the publication. See Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 92, at 416-18.
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negligence, then the bond rating agency would face asymmetric
costs. Financial information is like a public good, and it is difficult
to keep such information strictly between the parties who contract
for its production-and nearly impossible once actual trades are ex-
ecuted. Thus, whenever the rating agency discovers something use-
ful, it will only be compensated for part of the value of its
information. The costs of mistakes, however, would fall entirely on
the bond rating agency, despite the generally beneficial nature of its
research to society in general. 20' This would lead to underproduc-
tion of financial information, which is exactly what the first amend-
ment was intended to prevent.
To ensure the free ordering of private affairs based on efficient
information disclosure, we traditionally regulate publications only
where there are significant third party effects. 20 2 In the case of a
negligent rating, the only entities possibly harmed by a negligent
rating are the rated company and the subscriber, both of whom are
parties to the transaction. Both parties can discount the price of the
services supplied by the bond rating service. If courts were to allow
a relying plaintiff to recover for agency negligence, she would re-
ceive a duplicate recovery.
D. Some Miscellaneous Avenues of Recovery
A relying investor also might contend that, although there is no
general liability for bond rating agencies, her dealings with the rat-
ing agency have established, by contract, a greater standard of care
on the part of the agency. However, the major bond rating agencies
have not negotiated such contracts. 20 3 Instead, most bond rating
agencies have explicitly disclaimed liability, pointing out that they
rely on information supplied by others. Standard & Poor's warns
that "because of the possibility of human or mechanical error by our
sources, . . . [Standard & Poor's] does not guarantee the accuracy,
adequacy, or completeness of any information and is not responsi-
ble for any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from use
of such information." 20 4 Similarly, Moody's notes that while it "has
used due care and caution in the preparation" of its publications, its
201 Agencies are not fully compensated because not all people who benefit from
bond ratings subscribe to their publications. The ratings make their way into the gen-
eral financial press, where people consume them for the price of a newspaper.
202 Examples include obscenity, military secrets, incitement, libel, and fighting
words. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (states may
proscribe advocacy directed at inciting lawlessness); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957) (obscenity not constitutionally protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (state may proscribe "fighting words").
203 First Equity III, 869 F.2d at 179.
204 S & P CREDrrWEEK, supra note 10, at 2.
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information "has been obtained from sources believed to be accu-
rate and reliable, but because of the possibility of human and
mechanical error its accuracy or completeness is not guaran-
teed." 205 In short, while the major bond rating agencies are free to
ensure that their publications meet a higher standard of care, they
have chosen not to.206 Consumers discount the price they pay for
the agencies' services to reflect this lower standard of care. Al-
lowing recovery on a lesser showing would give the consumer a
windfall, a recovery on an insurance contract for which she has not
paid.20
7
A relying investor also might contend that the bond rating
agency is her fiduciary. 208 In the investment field, however, fiduci-
ary duties are implied only where there is a more specialized rela-
tionship than that which exists between a rating agency and its
subscribers.20 9 The basis may be contractual or imposed by opera-
tion of law, such as where one party holds herself out as a guarantor
of accuracy (e.g., an accountant).2 10 Bond rating agencies are re-
205 MOODY'S BOND RECORD, supra note 10, at i.
206 According to Supreme Court precedent, a plaintiff seeking damages under Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must show (1) a misrepresentation, an
omission, or incomplete disclosure, (2) the existence of a duty, (3) scienter, (4) material-
ity, (5) reliance, and (6) an injury caused by that reliance. See Dirks v. Securities & Exch.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983); Chiarella v United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35
(1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
In contrast, the accounting profession's Professional Standards require that:
The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding
the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect
that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be
expressed, the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases where an
auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the report should
contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's examina-
tion, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
AMERICAN INsTrrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccourrANrs, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
(CCH) § 431.01 (1980). The auditor is assumed to take full responsibility for the docu-
ments to which her name is attached, unless she clearly states otherwise.
207 See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
208 Judge Posner notes that the "[t]he fiduciary principle is the law's answer to the
problem of unequal costs of information. It allows you to hire someone with superior
information to deal on your behalf with others having superior information. It is thus a
device for lowering transaction costs." R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 101.
209 See id. at 389-90.
210 See, e.g., Zahorik v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 309,
314 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (duty under tort law is dependent on the relationship that exists
between broker and investor).
The accounting profession itself acknowledges its public responsibility:
The ethical code of the American Institute emphasizes the profes-
sion's responsibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as the
number of investors has grown, as the relationship between corporate
managers and stockholders has become more impersonal, and as govern-
ment increasingly relies on accounting information.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCouNTANTs, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS:
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ET § 51.04 (1982). In addition, the ethical code re-
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sponsible to thousands of investors. As the subcommittee report
preceding the adoption of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
noted:
The accepted rights of freedom of the press and due process
of law might prevent any general regulation and perhaps also su-
pervision over particular types of publications, even if the adver-
tisements of these publications occasionally quite exaggerate the
value of the factual information which is supplied. That the con-
stitutional guarantee of liberty of the press is applicable to publi-
cations of all types, and not only to newspapers, has been clearly
indicated by the United States Supreme Court.211
As the parties' relationship changes from one of private counseling
to one of public offerings of information, the client's fiduciary inter-
est declines, and the publisher's first amendment protections in-
crease. 212 Once the publication reaches the level of general
publishing, where the clients are known to the publisher only as
names on a mailing list, the publishers' fiduciary duty diminishes to
zero. Thus, Standard & Poor's has ample support for its contention
that "[r]atings do not create a fiduciary relationship between [Stan-
dard & Poor's] and users of the ratings since there is no legal basis
for the existence of such a relationship."
213
IV
THE EFFECT OF RETAINING A RECKLESSNESS STANDARD
"If competition among ideas is the method by which truth is
established, the suppression of an idea on the ground that it is
false is irrational, barring some market failure. An idea is false
only if rejected in the marketplace, and if it is rejected, there is no
occasion to suppress it."
'2 14
If courts were to reject the negligent misrepresentation stan-
dard, those parties who relied on negligent ratings would not be
compensated for their losses. This is the cost of a system that only
compensates victims of reckless behavior.2 15 The tradeoff, however,
is worthwhile, for it ensures a vigorous press that can publish with-
quires that auditors evaluate the internal statements the company provides and decide
whether they meet generally accepted accounting standards. Only if they do so may
auditors use them.
211 Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. on Securities and Exchange of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt. 1, 1007-09 (1940) (quoted in Lowe v. Securities &
Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 198 (1985)).
212 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
("[s]peech on matters of purely private concern is of less first amendment concern.").
213 S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 3.
214 R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 627.
215 Remarking on the similar preclusion of claims in the libel area, the Supreme
Court has noted:
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out fear of crippling lawsuits. As in the related area of defamation,
society has decided that "the competing public policy and constitu-
tional concerns tilt decidedly in favor of the press when mere negli-
gence is alleged. ' 216 Thus, courts have not allowed recovery
against publishers of poisonous recipes in cookbooks, 2 17 publishers
of defective advice on using tools,2 1 8 or publishers of dangerous
medical formulas. 219 They have not done so because the remedy for
false-or negligent-information is more information. Courts rely
on the market to chastise negligent ratings, not the judicial sys-
tem.2 20 If the market is deemed sufficient to protect the writers of
dangerous medical formulas, where information costs are high, and
fewer market incentives exist to promote accuracy, then surely soci-
ety should be less concerned about the dangers of potentially poorly
rated securities. Because it is relative easy to track the relative mer-
its of different rating agencies, the first amendment's admonishment
against excessive government oversight of the marketplace of ideas
bears a special warning. Careful examination of the rating agencies'
work shows that they generally produce a fine product. This is the
best reason of all for not changing a system that works.
CONCLUSION
Although the tort of negligent misrepresentation is making sig-
nificant inroads into the area of accountant liability, courts should
not extend the reasoning to bond rating agencies. First, the eco-
Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally sub-
jected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York
Times test. Despite this substantial abridgment of the state law right to
compensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the Court has con-
cluded that the protection of the New York Times privilege should be avail-
able to publishers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehood concerning
public officials and public figures.
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A publisher might lose to a relying plaintiff, however, if they publish negligent flight
charts. This is probably due to the dangerous nature of the potential harm, namely, loss
of life. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. deniedsub nom.
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nomic reasoning that many of the courts use to impose liability on
accountants is not nearly as clear-cut as these courts indicate. Sec-
ond, the economic case is weakened further in the context of secur-
ity rating agencies.
Economic theory indicates that rating agencies have a strong
incentive not to pursue negligent behavior, regardless of the stan-
dard of care required of them in court. Market studies show that
bond rating agencies have an enviable track record in evaluating risk
of default. Where there is little evidence of negligence, and where
the market provides large incentives to rating agencies to act non-
negligently, imposing a negligence standard is likely to increase
costs to the ultimate user without materially increasing bond rating
agencies' levels of investment in accuracy.
In addition, imposing a negligence standard will lead to con-
sumers paying mandatory negligence insurance with each subscrip-
tion to a security rating publication. Because it is difficult to price
discriminate between risky subscribers and relatively safe subscrib-
ers, liability for negligence will result in a cross-subsidized insurance
plan in which the small subscriber subsidizes the larger subscriber.
This, in turn, will lead to a self-selection bias whereby the smaller
investor is likely to be driven out of the market for rating publica-
tions. This is of particular concern because the imposition of a neg-
ligence standard should increase the level of investment based on
good information, not decrease it.
Courts cannot constitutionally allow recovery on any showing
less than recklessness because of the potential chilling effect that
imposing a negligence standard would have on rating publications.
Given the importance of financial information to investors and the
economy as a whole, bond rating constitutes a matter of "public
concern." Applying traditional first amendment law, the state's in-
terest in compensating relying investors must give way to the first
amendment's concern for the free flow of commercial information.
Society must rely on the market and competition to keep rating
agencies operating at their negligence threshold, not on courts and
juries.
The recent, questionable trend of imposing liability on account-
ants for negligence can easily be distinguished. An accountant au-
dits a company, and has access to many internal documents that a
rating agency, which only performs a survey, does not. In addition,
the two businesses are intended for different audiences, with the ac-
counting firm's audience being much smaller. Under the Supreme
Court's formulation of the first amendment in Dun & Bradstreet, this
is the difference between a news item of public concern and a pri-
vate report to which the public is indifferent.
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Both economics and the first amendment dictate the appropri-
ate standard of care for security rating agency liability, The
voracious appetite of negligent misrepresentation which has en-
gulfed the accounting profession and threatens the legal profession
should not be extended to the securities rating industry. Attorneys
and accountants had only the persuasive force of economic argu-
ments, but these were swept away by the perceived equities favoring
liability. The rating agencies, however, should be able to hold the
line with two additional weapons: new scholarship questioning the
old economic assumptions underlying the expansion of liability in
other areas, and the bulwark of the first amendment. Should those
courts which have expanded accountant liability be tempted to side-
step the first amendment, they should keep in mind that doing so on
the basis of perceived economic efficiency is no longer the obvious
solution it once appeared.
Gregory Husisian
